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Kratom Crackdown: How the DEA 
Abused Its Emergency Scheduling 




The Drug Enforcement Administration wields tremen-
dous power at scheduling a new drug or substance on an 
emergency basis under the Controlled Substances Act. The 
DEA newly leveled this power at a plant—kratom—with the 
potential to curb the menacing opioid epidemic in North 
America. This unprecedented effort has generated consider-
able controversy. Many individuals remonstrated the 
agency’s action, especially those facing life-threatening 
hardships because of the opioid crisis. Members of Congress 
also took a stand against the DEA’s unrivalled move to 
schedule kratom, suggesting that the agency had abused the 
emergency scheduling authority delegated by the legislative 
branch. 
This Comment explores the interplay between the DEA’s 
rulemaking authority, the public’s democratic participation 
in the DEA’s rulemaking process, and the legislative 
branch’s delegation of authority and oversight of the DEA’s 
rulemaking in the specific case of kratom.  
 
                                                                                                             
 *  Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2018, 
University of Miami School of Law; B.A., B.S. 2013, Florida International Uni-
versity. I am appreciative of Professor Ricardo J. Bascuas for identifying the topic 
and advising this Comment. Nothing is ever written, it is rewritten. This Comment 
benefitted from countless edits suggested by dear friends and law review col-
leagues for whom I am beyond grateful. A special thank you to my parents for 
their unwavering support and guidance through all my academic pursuits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Karisa Rowland has carried out a simple ritual she claims saved 
her life.1 Every morning, since 2014, she takes a bag of green pow-
der from her fridge, stirs about a teaspoonful into a mug with water, 
and drinks it like a cup of tea.2 Not long ago, Rowland struggled 
with a serious prescription opioid dependence.3 After making it 
through several back surgeries, she began taking pills—hydroco-
done, fentanyl, and oxycodone—to cope with her chronic pain.4 
Upon hitting an all-time low, Rowland mustered the courage to end 
the nightmare she was living.5 After years of prescription opioid de-
pendence, a plant from Southeast Asia—kratom—was her salva-
tion.6 Rowland’s story is not uncommon. The United States is in the 
throes of a prescription opioid epidemic described as “the deadliest 
drug crisis in American history.”7 From Florida to California, mil-
lions of Americans wake up each day to face a serious prescription 
opioid dependence.8 In 2015, an estimated 3.8 million people (aged 
twelve or older) had a substance use disorder involving prescription 
pain relievers.9 Rowland is also part of a growing number of kratom 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Lauren Silverman, All Things Considered: Kratom Advocates Speak 
Out Against Proposed Government Ban (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://tinyurl.com/hn4wv2u (interviewing Karisa Rowland) [hereinafter All 
Things Considered]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Maya Salam, The Opioid Epidemic: A Crisis Years in the Making, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/yapn4oru. 
 8 Opioids are a class of drugs that include heroin and prescription pain re-
lievers, such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, codeine, morphine, and fentanyl. These 
substances are chemically related and interact with opioid receptors on nerve cells 
in the body and brain to produce euphoria and pain relief. Drugs of Abuse: Opi-
oids, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://tinyurl.com/ycm9zbx7 (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2018). 
 9 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., PUB. NO. SMA 16-4984, KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2015 
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advocates in America who use the Asian plant for its promising ef-
fects in treating chronic pain and alleviating opioid addiction.10 The 
American Kratom Association estimates that there are three to five 
million kratom consumers in the United States.11 Just as kratom’s 
rapid popularity attracted the interest of many Americans suffering 
from chronic pain and prescription opioid addiction, so too U.S. 
government officials became interested in kratom and its effects.12 
On August 30, 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration an-
nounced its intent to place two kratom components—mitragynine 
and 7-hydroxymitragynine—into Schedule I of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.13 In the press release announcing its action, the DEA 
justified the emergency scheduling of kratom based on a finding that 
it posed an imminent hazard to the public safety.14 The next day, the 
DEA published an official notice of intent in the Federal Register,15 
beginning the thirty-day countdown until kratom would become a 
Schedule I controlled substance, placing it alongside heroin, LSD, 
and marijuana.16 
                                                                                                             
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 8 (2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/y7o2jh8q. 
 10 See All Things Considered, supra note 1. 
 11 American Kratom Association Factsheet, AMERICAN KRATOM ASS’N, 
https://tinyurl.com/yazlk9l4 (last updated Oct. 3, 2016). The American Kratom 
Association is a non-profit organization, launched in early 2015, representing the 
growing number of kratom users—including doctors, lawyers, teachers, and law 
enforcement officers—and working to help protect their ability to use kratom for 
improved health and well-being. About Us, AMERICAN KRATOM ASS’N, 
http://www.americankratom.org/about (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). 
 12 Since 2013, kratom has been on the DEA’s watch list. DRUG ENF’T 
ADMIN., OFF. OF DIVERSION CONTROL, Kratom (Mitragyna speciosa korth), 
https://tinyurl.com/yal58sde; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 
DRUGS OF ABUSE: DEA RESOURCE GUIDE 84 (2017), https://tinyurl.com/jxy2mlz 
(listing kratom as a drug and chemical of concern). 
 13 Press Release, Drug Enf’t Admin., DEA Announces Intent to Schedule 
Kratom (Aug. 30, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yb8ev8uy. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Mitragynine 
and 7-Hydroxymitragynine into Schedule I, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,929 (proposed Aug. 
31, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308) [hereinafter Kratom Scheduling No-
tice]. 
 16 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012) (listing controlled substances under Schedule I). 
976 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:972 
 
The DEA invoked the emergency scheduling authority under the 
CSA17 in an unprecedented move to take rapid action against a nat-
ural, botanical substance with a history of safe use and promising 
medicinal benefits.18 Worse yet, the DEA initially sought to ban 
kratom with no opportunity for a public comment period.19 After the 
DEA’s swift action, kratom advocates became justifiably con-
cerned.20 How can kratom pose an imminent hazard to public 
safety? How can a government agency make such a significant de-
cision without giving the public a chance to comment? Why does 
the DEA have this power? What, if anything, can Congress do about 
it? Where does this leave kratom advocates? 
This Comment presents a unique observation into the mecha-
nism of a federal agency’s rulemaking authority and the interplay 
between public participation and congressional oversight into a fed-
eral agency’s rulemaking process. In Parts I and II, I present the 
backdrop to the DEA’s proposed emergency scheduling of kratom. 
Specifically, in Part I, I trace the events that led to kratom’s rapid 
popularity in the United States, including the menacing opioid epi-
demic, and I present the therapeutic qualities of kratom that make it 
a viable alternative to enslaving prescription opioids. 
In Part II, I sketch the statutory scheduling framework under the 
CSA and decipher the specific provision under which the DEA de-
cided to control kratom, the so-called emergency scheduling author-
ity. I set out, in detail, the purpose, legislative history, and relevant 
agency decisional precedent of the emergency scheduling authority. 
In Part III, I probe the DEA’s analysis and evidence considered 
in reaching its perfunctory decision to control kratom on an emer-
gency basis. I show that kratom does not meet the legal criteria re-
quired for emergency scheduling, that kratom is not a substance that 
Congress intended to control with the emergency scheduling author-
ity, and that the application of such authority to kratom is a signifi-
cant departure from relevant agency decisional precedent. Given 
these considerations, I argue in Part IV that the DEA committed an 
                                                                                                             
 17 Id. § 811(h). 
 18 See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 19 Kratom Scheduling Notice, supra note 15, at 59,933 (“The DEA believes 
that the notice and comment requirements of section 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act . . . do not apply to this notice of intent.”). 
 20 All Things Considered, supra note 1. 
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ultra vires act and disregarded legislative directive. Indeed, the DEA 
overstepped its statutory authority by invoking the emergency 
scheduling authority to control a natural, botanical substance. 
Lastly, I highlight the importance of congressional oversight into a 
federal agency’s rulemaking authority and conclude with an over-
view on what kratom advocates can expect going forward. 
My argument is not that the DEA lacks the authority to proceed 
with the scheduling of kratom under the formal scheduling process, 
which offers a greater opportunity for review and discussion by all 
members of the public. I argue only that the DEA may not invoke 
the emergency scheduling authority to control a natural, botanical 
substance (or any similar substance) in the absence of evidence that 
such emergency scheduling is necessary to avoid an imminent haz-
ard to the public safety, which is harmonious with the directive of 
Congress. If the DEA can employ the emergency scheduling author-
ity as it desires, if it can disregard legislative directive defined by 
Congress, and if it can deprive the public of participation in the rule-
making process—a vital cog in any democracy—with only minimal 
reprimands, then it is time to rethink the significant rulemaking 
power wielded by such federal agencies and the need for substantial 
congressional oversight of their rulemaking authority. 
I.  THE NEED FOR KRATOM: HOW WE GOT HERE 
A.  The Menacing Opioid Epidemic 
In 1860, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the physician father of Su-
preme Court Justice Holmes, declared of the medicine of his day: “I 
firmly believe that if the whole materia medica, as now used, could 
be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would be all the better for man-
kind, —and all the worse for the fishes.”21 Less than half of the pills 
                                                                                                             
 21 The entirety of Dr. Holmes’ statement contains specific exclusions for 
opium, anesthetics, and wine, and concludes with a caveat: 
Throw out opium, which the Creator himself seems to pre-
scribe, for we often see the scarlet poppy growing in the corn-
fields, as if it were foreseen that wherever there is hunger to be 
fed there must also be pain to be soothed; throw out a few spe-
cifics which our art did not discover, and is hardly needed to 
apply; throw out wine, which is a food, and the vapors which 
produce the miracle of anesthesia, and I firmly believe that if 
the whole materia medica, as now used, could be sunk to the 
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prescribed by physicians today had been conceived back then. Now, 
the opioid epidemic is responsible for killing more Americans each 
year than both car accidents and gun-related crimes.22 
The prescription opioid epidemic is not limited to addiction; it 
also covers taking medication for attaining recreational highs or tak-
ing medication prescribed for someone else.23 Prescription con-
trolled substances generally fall into three categories: (1) pain re-
lievers, also known as painkillers, analgesics, or opioids; (2) depres-
sants used to treat anxiety or insomnia; and (3) stimulants used to 
treat attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.24 
The number of opioid prescriptions dispensed by U.S. pharma-
cies over the last decade shows how the current opioid epidemic has 
been years in the making. From 2006, the number of opioid prescrip-
tions steadily increased until it peaked in 2012 at more than 255 mil-
lion prescriptions dispensed—plenty to give every American adult 
his or her own bottle of pills.25 A rise in opioid-related deaths soon 
followed. In 2015, there were 33,091 opioid overdose deaths 
alone.26 The latest figures show more than 64,000 Americans died 
from drug overdoses in 2016—with over 20,000 overdose deaths 
                                                                                                             
bottom of the sea, it would be all the better for mankind, —and 
all the worse for the fishes. But to justify this proposition, I must 
add that the injuries inflicted by over-medication are to a great 
extent masked by disease. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Currents and Counter-Currents in Medical Science, in 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MEDICAL ESSAYS 1842–1882, 202–03 (1883) (cita-
tion omitted). 
 22 Niall McCarthy, Drugs Are Killing More Americans Than Road Crashes 
[Infographic], FORBES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ybm76zbs; Christo-
pher Ingraham, Heroin Deaths Surpass Gun Homicides for the First Time, CDC 
Data Shows, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 8, 2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/ycwnmazz. 
 23 ERIN BAGALMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43559, PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG ABUSE 1 (2014). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Opioid Overdose: U.S. Prescribing Rate Maps, CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://tinyurl.com/y9pxrrzt (last updated July 31, 
2017). 
 26 Rose A. Rudd et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose 
Deaths — United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
1445 (Dec. 30, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y75mnbnc. 
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related to fentanyl and other synthetic opioids.27 Based on these 
numbers, 175 people die each day from an opioid overdose.28 If this 
is not daunting enough, the life expectancy for Americans declined 
in 2016 for the first time since 1993—a result of rising fatalities 
from an array of deteriorating health problems including drug over-
doses.29 
The origin of this epidemic goes back to the 1990s, a decade that 
spawned a wave of support for alternative treatments for chronic 
pain in America.30 Previously, the inadequate treatment of pain by 
physicians, which caused unnecessary patient suffering,31 grew 
from fears of investigation or state disciplinary action by regulatory 
agencies for prescribing opioids to manage chronic pain.32 As a re-
sult, physicians under-prescribed opioids to their patients, even 
though prescribing them for pain management was a legitimate 
medical practice.33 Indeed, physicians’ fears were warranted since 
some state board policies contained statements and recommenda-
tions that discouraged the use of opioid analgesics for pain manage-
ment.34 
Then, in 1997, the Federation of State Medical Boards in the 
United States organized two expert panels on pain, policy, and reg-
ulation to encourage compassionate pain management.35 The task 
force developed the Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled 
Substances for the Treatment of Pain, which was disseminated to all 
                                                                                                             
 27 Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://ti-
nyurl.com/pa2zgw2 (last updated Sept. 2017). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Lenny Bernstein, U.S. Life Expectancy Declines for the First Time Since 
1993, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/gnnt89b. 
 30 See William Brangham, Opioid Addiction Is the Biggest Drug Epidemic in 
U.S. History: How’d We Get Here?, PBS NEWSHOUR: AMERICA ADDICTED (Sept. 
29, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/yanh7cm8. 
 31 See Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Phar-
maceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 465 (2017) (“The origins of 
the surge in prescription opioid use can be traced to increased awareness of the 
widespread prevalence and under-treatment of pain.”). 
 32 David E. Joranson et al., Pain Management, Controlled Substances, and 
State Medical Board Policy: A Decade of Change, 23 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 
138, 139 (2002). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 142. 
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state medical boards for consideration.36 As part of a public forum 
to receive comments on drafting the model guidelines, a representa-
tive of the DEA offered a written statement which stated in part: 
“The guidelines will help physicians comply with acceptable pain 
management standards and will help [the] DEA and other regulators 
determine whether such treatment is appropriate . . . .”37 The end 
goal was for the guidelines to “help ensure patient access to needed 
controlled substances for pain management.”38 
Following the introduction of the guidelines, physicians began 
prescribing more opioids to patients with chronic pain.39 Needless 
to say, big pharmaceutical companies quickly jumped on the band-
wagon and fueled an aggressive marketing campaign to sell opi-
oids.40 The rate of opioid prescriptions began to snowball with “re-
tail purchases of methadone, hydrocodone, and oxycodone in the 
United States increas[ing] 13-fold, 4-fold, and 9-fold, respec-
tively.”41 This increase in legitimate sales of opioids triggered a pro-
liferation of these addictive substances for nonmedical uses.42 The 
impact of this pharmacoepidemic has been most evident in rural 
states, especially West Virginia, which witnessed the nation’s larg-
est increase in drug overdose mortality rates from 1999 to 2004.43 
                                                                                                             
 36 Joranson et al., supra note 32, at 142. 
 37 Id. at 142–43. 
 38 Id. at 143 (footnote omitted). 
 39 Physicians must be registered with the DEA to prescribe such controlled 
substances or be exempted by regulation from registration. 21 U.S.C. § 822 
(2012); see also JOSEPH T. RANNAZZISI & MARK W. CAVERLY, DRUG ENF’T 
ADMIN., PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 7 (2006), https://tinyurl.com/y76hfeok [herein-
after DEA PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL]. 
 40 See Sarpatwari et al., supra note 31, at 466 (“Purdue Pharma successfully 
contributed to and capitalized on the medical establishment’s changing view of 
pain management.”). 
 41 Aron J. Hall et al., Patterns of Abuse Among Unintentional Pharmaceutical 
Overdose Fatalities, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2613, 2613 (2008) (footnote omit-
ted). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. A study of all state residents who died of unintentional pharmaceutical 
overdoses in West Virginia in 2006, found that most overdose deaths were asso-
ciated with nonmedical use and diversion of pharmaceuticals, mostly from opioid 
analgesics. Id. 
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Middle-aged white Americans are the most vulnerable group suffer-
ing from “diseases of despair”—overdoses, alcoholism, and sui-
cide.44 
The epidemic’s unsettling numbers have prompted serious ac-
tion to combat opioid dependence across the United States. In Octo-
ber 2015, President Barack Obama announced a nationwide plan in 
which more than 540,000 health care providers were to complete 
training on appropriate opioid prescribing.45 The Obama administra-
tion also proposed $1.1 billion in new funding to address the pre-
scription opioid epidemic, with over $900 million to support coop-
erative agreements with states to expand access to medication-as-
sisted treatment for opioid addiction.46 President Obama confirmed 
that much remains to be done to properly address the opioid epi-
demic.47 This includes seeing the opioid crisis as a public health 
problem rather than solely as a drug enforcement concern.48 Despite 
efforts by President Obama to tackle the opioid epidemic, the DEA 
pursued its own agenda and undermined such efforts by trying to 
control a plant that might be the remedy so many opioid-dependent 
Americans need. 
B.  Kratom: A New Hope? 
For centuries, humans have turned to plant-derived substances 
to treat diseases, manage the stresses of life, and attain altered states 
                                                                                                             
 44 Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife 
Among White Non-Hispanic Americans in the 21st Century, 112 PNAS 15,078, 
15,079 (2015); Bernstein, supra note 29; Olga Khazan, Middle-Aged White Amer-
icans Are Dying of Despair, ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2015), https://ti-
nyurl.com/nedzl9n. 
 45 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Obama Admin-
istration Announces Public and Private Sector Efforts to Address Prescription 
Drug Abuse and Heroin Use (Oct. 21, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/hnwupg8. 
 46 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: President Obama 
Proposes $1.1 Billion in New Funding to Address the Prescription Opioid Abuse 
and Heroin Use Epidemic (Feb. 2, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ya8njqvz; see also 
Gardiner Harris, Obama Seeks More Than $1 Billion to Fight Opioid Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/yacceb7l. 
 47 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Re-
form, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 858–60 (2017) (addressing opioid misuse and ad-
diction). 
 48 Id. at 858–59 (noting that “the opioid epidemic is a public health problem 
that requires a public health response”). 
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of consciousness.49 Despite the advancement of pharmaceuticals 
and medical practices, many people still use herbal or botanical rem-
edies either as alternatives to, or in combination with, conventional 
medical care.50 In 2012, one in three U.S. adults used complemen-
tary health approaches to relieve pain.51 Americans are willing to 
spend money on complementary health alternatives with total out-
of-pocket spending adding up to $30.2 billion in 2012.52 Small won-
der, then, that a plant with promising medical uses—like kratom—
is widely accepted among Americans who wish to alleviate disrup-
tive pains and serious opioid addiction. 
Kratom (mitragyna speciosa) is a plant indigenous to Southeast 
Asia, found primarily in Thailand and Malaysia.53 Kratom belongs 
to a small genus in the Rubiaceae family, which also includes the 
coffee plant.54 The major chemical compound in kratom, mitragyn-
ine, constitutes about 66% of the plant’s total alkaloidal content.55 
Kratom has been used in Southeast Asia for hundreds of years 
mostly by farmers, laborers, and fisherman to offset fatigue while 
working in hot temperatures.56 The leaves can be chewed or steeped 
into teas to treat fever, analgesia, diarrhea, coughing, hypertension, 
opiate withdrawal, and even depression.57 In small doses, kratom 
                                                                                                             
 49 See Walter C. Prozialeck et al., Pharmacology of Kratom: An Emerging 
Botanical Agent with Stimulant, Analgesic and Opioid-Like Effects, 112 J. AM. 
OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 792, 792 (2012). 
 50 See id.; ANDREW CHEVALLIER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HERBAL MEDICINE 9 
(3d ed. 2016) (“From the earliest of times, herbs have been prized for their pain-
relieving and healing abilities, and today we still rely on the curative properties of 
plants in about 75 percent of our medicines.”). 
 51 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Use of 
Complementary Health Approaches in the U.S.: What Complementary and Inte-
grative Approaches Do Americans Use?, https://tinyurl.com/y8mmgqzn (last 
modified Sept. 24, 2017). 
 52 Id. 
 53 KRATOM AND OTHER MITRAGYNINES: THE CHEMISTRY AND 
PHARMACOLOGY OF OPIOIDS FROM A NON-OPIUM SOURCE ix (Robert B. Raffa 
ed., 2015) [hereinafter KRATOM AND OTHER MITRAGYNINES]. 
 54 Sasha W. Eisenman, The Botany of Mitragyna speciosa (Korth.) Havil. and 
Related Species, in KRATOM AND OTHER MITRAGYNINES, supra note 53, at 57, 
58. 
 55 Vedanjali Gogineni et al., Phytochemistry of Mitragyna speciosa, in 
KRATOM AND OTHER MITRAGYNINES, supra note 53, at 77, 79. 
 56 Eisenman, supra note 54, at 57. 
 57 KRATOM AND OTHER MITRAGYNINES, supra note 53, at ix. 
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produces a stimulant-like effect similar to coffee.58 In high doses, 
kratom produces an opioid-like effect, helpful for managing opioid 
withdrawal symptoms.59 
Despite its centuries-long history and extensive use in Southeast 
Asia, kratom has only recently captured the attention of Westerners 
as a botanical supplement.60 The growth of kratom in the United 
States is partly due to its expanded availability on the Internet.61 
Various websites have surfaced describing kratom’s myriad uses.62 
An increasing number of posts and blogs come from individuals us-
ing kratom to self-treat chronic pain or wean off addiction to opioids 
such as heroin and prescription pain relievers.63 
Although early publications muddled the therapeutic benefits of 
kratom,64 recent studies have described the plant as a natural alter-
native for the treatment of opioid addiction.65 Reports of kratom be-
ing used to treat opioid withdrawal symptoms were published as 
early as 1932.66 But no study examined the perceived benefits of 
kratom to manage opioid withdrawal symptoms until 2010, when 
136 active kratom users in northern Malaysia were surveyed.67 The 
study found that most users relied on kratom to suppress opioid 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Prozialeck et al., supra note 49, at 793. 
 61 Id. (discussing kratom’s increased Internet presence); see also Eisenman, 
supra note 54, at 68 (same). 
 62 Prozialeck et al., supra note 49, at 793 (describing the content of websites 
on kratom). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Eisenman, supra note 54, at 67 (“Early documents confused the situation, 
with most referring to the use of [kratom] as an opium substitute while other early 
reports spoke of its use as an anti-opium plant or an opium remedy.”) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65 See, e.g., Edward W. Boyer et al., Self-Treatment of Opioid Withdrawal 
Using Kratom (Mitragynia speciosa korth), 103 ADDICTION 1048, 1049 (2008) 
[hereinafter Boyer I]; Edward W. Boyer et al., Self-Treatment of Opioid With-
drawal with a Dietary Supplement, Kratom, 16 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 352, 352 
(2007). 
 66 Khem Singh Grewal, Observations on the Pharmacology of Mitragynine, 
46 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 251, 251 (1932). 
 67 Balasingam Vicknasingam et al., The Informal Use of Ketum (Mitragyna 
speciosa) for Opioid Withdrawal in the Northern States of Peninsular Malaysia 
and Implications for Drug Substitution Therapy, 21 INT’L J. DRUG POLICY 283, 
283 (2010). 
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withdrawal symptoms because it was a cheap alternative with no 
serious side effects despite prolonged use.68 The first published U.S. 
study to report the prevalence and motivations for kratom use among 
a sample of substance users enrolled in treatment found that persons 
use kratom for a variety of reasons, “including as an alternative for 
addressing drug dependence and chronic pain, for reducing anxiety, 
and to improve well-being.”69 Further, withdrawal symptoms from 
kratom are less severe than from prescription opioids, with symp-
toms usually disappearing after one to three days.70 Although still in 
its infancy, Western research on kratom shows that it holds the po-
tential to be used as an effective treatment alternative for opioid ad-
diction.71 
C.   The DEA Threatens to Ban Kratom 
Despite recent scientific evidence of kratom’s palliative effects, 
on August 31, 2016, the DEA published a notice in the Federal Reg-
ister stating its intent to place mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragyn-
ine, two main kratom compounds, into Schedule I of the CSA.72 The 
agency justified this action based on a finding that the scheduling of 
kratom’s main compounds was necessary to avoid an imminent haz-
ard to public safety.73 In reaching its decision, the DEA asserted that 
these compounds have a high potential for abuse, no currently ac-
cepted medical use in treatment, and a lack of accepted safety for 
use under medical supervision.74 Together with its notice of intent, 
                                                                                                             
 68 Id. at 287. 
 69 Kirsten Elin Smith & Thomas Lawson, Prevalence and Motivations for 
Kratom Use in a Sample of Substance Users Enrolled in a Residential Treatment 
Program, 180 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 340, 344 (2017). 
 70 Darshan Singh et al., Traditional and Non-Traditional Uses of Mitragynine 
(Kratom): A Survey of the Literature, 126 BRAIN RES. BULL. 41, 44 (2016) (noting 
physical withdrawal symptoms include lethargy, irritability, frequent yawning, 
runny nose, muscular pain, cramps, joint pain, and diarrhea) [hereinafter Kratom: 
Survey of the Literature]; Boyer I, supra note 65, at 1049 (finding that kratom 
alleviates potentially severe opioid withdrawal, yet cessation of kratom use itself 
appears to be associated with modest withdrawal symptoms). 
 71 Kratom: Survey of the Literature, supra note 70, at 45 (noting “kratom 
holds the potential to be developed as a treatment option for opiate dependence”). 
 72 Kratom Scheduling Notice, supra note 15. 
 73 Id. at 59,929. 
 74 Id. at 59,930. These are the requirements for placement of a substance into 
Schedule I of the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012). Thus, a substance meeting the 
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the DEA provided a three-factor analysis as required under an emer-
gency scheduling action.75 The publication provided for thirty days’ 
notice to place kratom into Schedule I.76 The DEA also stated its 
belief that the public comment requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act77 were not applicable to the emergency scheduling 
action.78 
D.  The Public Outcry 
The DEA’s ill-considered notice of intent to schedule kratom did 
not go unnoticed. Within a week, a petition calling on President 
Obama to weigh in on the DEA’s unprecedented action reached over 
100,000 signatures.79 Hundreds of kratom advocates rallied at the 
White House.80 Supporters held “I Am Kratom” signs while others 
offered brewed kratom tea in red Solo cups to anyone who wanted 
a try.81 Attendees at the rally included a former heroin addict who 
traveled from North Carolina, a physics teacher from Virginia who 
                                                                                                             
statutory requirements for temporary scheduling may only be placed into Sched-
ule I. Id. § 811(h)(1). 
 75 DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., Mitragynine and 7-Hydroxymitragynine: Back-
ground Information and Evaluation of ‘Three Factor Analysis’ (Factors 4, 5 and 
6) for Temporary Scheduling (Aug. 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ydz4blaq [herein-
after Kratom Three Factor Analysis]. This evaluation contains the DEA’s asser-
tions with respect to the finding of an imminent hazard to the public safety based 
on three factors: (1) the substance’s history and current pattern of abuse, (2) the 
scope, duration, and significance of abuse, and (3) what, if any, risk there is to the 
public health. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(3). 
 76 Kratom Scheduling Notice, supra note 15, at 59,933. Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act’s requirements for notice and comment, agencies must gen-
erally allow at least thirty days to pass between the publication of a proposed rule 
and its effective date. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). 
 77 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 78 Kratom Scheduling Notice, supra note 15, at 59,933. 
 79 Please Do Not Make Kratom a Schedule I Substance, WE THE PEOPLE 
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/ycdznrwa (archiving petition website); see 
also Nick Wing, More Than 100,000 People Urge Obama to Stop the DEA from 
Banning Kratom, HUFFPOST (Sept. 7, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/j6oofxj. 
 80 Steven Nelson, Kratom Advocates Sip Tea and Seethe at White House 
Rally Against DEA Ban, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/gqpeetf. 
 81 Id. 
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takes kratom to treat arthritis, and a Colorado kratom shop owner 
who recovered from alcoholism.82 
While the DEA was inundated with comments from kratom us-
ers,83 members of Congress were organizing their own backlash.84 
Representatives Mark Pocan and Matt Salmon drafted a “Dear Col-
league” letter in a bipartisan effort to delay the DEA’s imminent 
kratom ban.85 The Pocan-Salmon letter, signed by fifty-one mem-
bers of Congress, urged the DEA to delay its decision on the place-
ment of kratom into Schedule I and to “provide ample time for pub-
lic comment on this significant decision.”86 The letter mentioned a 
federally funded study conducted by the University of Massachu-
setts and the University of Mississippi on the use of kratom as a 
remedy for opioid addiction.87 Researchers of this study applied for 
a patent identifying the kratom compound, mitragynine, as a bene-
ficial treatment for addictive drugs besides opiate derivatives.88 
Notable Senators penned a similar letter petitioning the DEA to 
postpone its emergency action to schedule kratom.89 The Senate let-
ter seemed to cast greater doubt on the DEA’s exercise of the emer-
gency scheduling authority. Indeed, the Senators insisted that the 
                                                                                                             
 82 Id. The Colorado kratom shop owner claimed that his store was shut down 
by local officials after kratom was banned in the state. Id. 
 83 See Christopher Ingraham, The DEA Wants to Ban Another Plant. Re-
searchers Say the Plan is ‘Insane.’, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://tinyurl.com/y8zgxphj. 
 84 Nick Wing, Congress Calls Out DEA for Unilateral Move to Expand the 
War on Drugs, HUFFPOST (Sept. 26, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/zo5jznx. 
 85 Steven Nelson, Dozens of Congressmen Ask DEA Not to Ban Kratom Next 
Week, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/zkqaxej. 
 86 Letter from Mark Pocan et al., U.S. Reps., to Charles P. Rosenberg, Acting 
Adm’r, Drug Enf’t Admin. (Sept. 26, 2016) (on file with author) (addressing con-
cerns from twenty-eight Democrats and twenty-three Republicans, including two 
medical doctors, who represent congressional districts from twenty-four states, 
including Florida, California, Georgia, Colorado, Virginia, New York, and 
Texas). 
 87 Id. For more information on the study see, Barbara Lago, New Hope for 
Addicts, UNIV. MISS. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2013), http://news.olemiss.edu/new-hope-
for-addicts/. 
 88 U.S. Patent Application No. 12/623,064 (filed Nov. 20, 2009). 
 89 Sanders, Hatch and Nine Other U.S. Senators Urge DEA To Halt Push to 
Ban Natural Herb Kratom, BOTANICAL EDUC. ALL., https://tinyurl.com/ychlzh4e 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2017). 
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DEA should arrange a public comment period and “outline its evi-
dentiary standards to Congress regarding the justification for [the] 
proposed action.”90 The letter further emphasized that “the use of 
this emergency authority for a natural substance is unprece-
dented.”91 Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey stressed that an “in-
creasing body of research has shown kratom’s potential value as a 
treatment for a number of conditions.”92 By the time the DEA re-
ceived these congressional letters, numerous news reports had 
popped up further criticizing the DEA’s hasty decision to ban 
kratom.93 The message was clear: The DEA had targeted a natural, 
botanical substance that might be a solution to the U.S. opioid epi-
demic.94 
E.  The DEA Backpedals 
On October 13, 2016, the DEA, facing a storm of public and 
congressional criticism, reversed its decision to invoke the emer-
gency scheduling authority to place kratom into Schedule I of the 
                                                                                                             
 90 Letter from Orrin G. Hatch et al., U.S. Senators, to Charles P. Rosenberg, 
Acting Adm’r, Drug Enf’t Admin. (Sept. 30, 2016) (on file with author) [herein-
after Senate Letter to DEA]. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Letter from Corey A. Booker et al., U.S. Senators, to Charles P. Rosenberg, 
Acting Adm’r, Drug Enf’t Admin. (Sept. 29, 2016) (on file with author) (attaching 
an open letter from Andrew Kruegel and ten other scientists). Senator Booker ref-
erenced an open letter to Congress sent by eleven scientists from well-respected 
research institutions expressing “grave concern” about the DEA’s proposed action 
against kratom. Id. 
 93 See, e.g., Angus Chen, Kratom Drug Ban May Cripple Promising Pain-
killer Research, SCI. AM. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y7tflts6; Douglas 
Main, War Veteran on Kratom: DEA Taking Away Right to a Manageable Life, 
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 15, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/gm8ef4s; Nick Wing, Feds De-
clare War on Herb Touted as a Solution to Opioid Addiction, HUFFPOST (Aug. 
30, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/z6nvzjo; Baynard Woods, Federal Crackdown on 
Drug Some Say Treats Opioid Addiction Faces Backlash, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 
2016), https://tinyurl.com/ydddvj77. 
 94 Nick Wing, Some Say Kratom Is a Solution to Opioid Addiction. Not If 
Drug Warriors Ban It First, HUFFPOST (Mar. 3, 2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/zd7x9uw. 
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CSA.95 While viewed as a shocking move by some drug policy ex-
perts,96 the DEA’s backpedaling came as a respite for many kratom 
advocates.97 The DEA heeded the concerns of Congress and decided 
to allow an official public comment period until December 1, 
2016.98 The DEA recognized the various comments from the public 
challenging the notice to outlaw kratom.99 It also asked the Food and 
Drug Administration to expedite a scientific and medical evaluation 
and scheduling recommendation for the two main kratom com-
pounds.100 
Allowing an opportunity for public comment by all interested 
parties was a step in the right direction. But whether the public’s 
comments on kratom will be heard and considered by the DEA re-
mains to be seen.101 DEA spokesman Russell Baer made clear: “This 
withdrawal of our notice of intent to temporarily schedule kratom 
should not be misconstrued . . . [the] DEA still firmly believes 
                                                                                                             
 95 Withdrawal of Notice of Intent to Temporarily Place Mitragynine and 7-
Hydroxymitragynine into Schedule I, 81 Fed. Reg. 70,652 (proposed Oct. 13, 
2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308) [hereinafter Withdrawal of Kratom 
Scheduling]. 
 96 See Christopher Ingraham, The DEA Is Withdrawing a Proposal to Ban 
Another Plant After the Internet Got Really Mad, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 
12, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y9zzauqo (quoting a leading expert on drug policy 
at the Brookings Institution saying, “The DEA is not one to second-guess itself, 
no matter what the facts are”); Press Release, Drug Pol’y All., In Unprecedented 
Move, Drug Enforcement Administration Withdraws Emergency Kratom Ban, 
(Oct. 11, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y9cgglwt. 
 97 Lauren Silverman, Good News for Some Folks in Pain: DEA Delays Ban 
on Kratom Until at Least December, KERA NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/h7eda4q; Lauren Silverman, Kratom Gets Reprieve from Drug En-
forcement Administration, NPR: SHOTS (Oct. 12, 2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/zttt6by [hereinafter Silverman, Kratom Gets Reprieve]. 
 98 Withdrawal of Kratom Scheduling, supra note 95, at 70,652. 
 99 Id. DEA spokesman Russell Baer confirmed that they received more than 
2,000 phone calls since August of that year in opposition to the kratom ban. Sil-
verman, Kratom Gets Reprieve, supra note 97. 
 100 Withdrawal of Kratom Scheduling, supra note 95, at 70,653. 
 101 See Jonathan Weinberg, The Right to Be Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 149, 150–51 (2012) (arguing that the public’s participation in government 
rulemaking is “a two-way dialogic commitment,” and that “we should focus less 
on the individual’s ability to comment than on the government’s obligation to 
hear, engage, and respond”). 
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kratom is dangerous and is harmful.”102 As time has shown, the 
DEA systematically rejects scientific evidence when determining 
the proper scheduling of substances under the CSA.103 
II.  STATUTORY SCHEDULING FRAMEWORK UNDER THE CSA 
In 1970, Congress enacted the CSA under Title II of the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.104 The CSA 
created five categories or schedules for the allocation of various 
plants, drugs, and chemicals based on the substance’s medical use, 
potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability.105 Schedule 
I, the most restrictive category, contains substances that have “a high 
potential for abuse,” have “no currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States,” and lack “accepted safety use . . . 
under medical supervision.”106 Substances in this group include her-
oin, LSD, ecstasy, and (to this day) marijuana.107 Schedule II in-
cludes substances that are also subject to abuse but are accepted for 
medical use in the United States.108 For these substances, there is an 
awareness that abuse “may lead to severe psychological or physical 
dependence.”109 Schedule II substances include morphine and 
opium.110 Substances in Schedules III through V all have a currently 
                                                                                                             
 102 Steven Nelson, DEA Withdraws Kratom Ban, Opens Public Comment Pe-
riod, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y9m3gyc8. 
 103 DRUG POLICY ALL. & MAPS, THE DEA: FOUR DECADES OF IMPEDING AND 
REJECTING SCIENCE 2 (June 6, 2014), https://tinyurl.com/mcoaf7g (describing the 
DEA’s most common tactics “to maintain the existing, scientifically unsupported 
drug scheduling system and to obstruct research that might alter current drug 
schedules”); see also Christen D. Shepherd, Comment, Lethal Concentration of 
Power: How the D.E.A. Acts Improperly to Prohibit the Growth of Industrial 
Hemp, 68 UMKC L. REV. 239, 242 (1999) (arguing that the DEA controls indus-
trial hemp through an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of “marijuana” de-
spite qualities of hemp that make it a valuable agricultural commodity). 
 104 Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012)). 
 105 BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34635, THE CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES ACT: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012). 
 106 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 107 Id. § 812(c); see also DEA PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL, supra note 39, at 5. 
 108 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2)(A)–(B). 
 109 Id. § 812(b)(2)(C). 
 110 DEA PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL, supra note 39, at 5. 
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accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, with gradu-
ally lower potentials for abuse and severity of dependence.111 Under 
the CSA, Congress authorized the Attorney General to schedule, 
transfer between schedules, or remove a substance from a sched-
ule.112 Then, in 1973, the Attorney General delegated the perfor-
mance of these tasks to the Administrator of the DEA.113 
A.  Formal or Permanent Scheduling 
The CSA provides a statutory framework for the federal govern-
ment to regulate the lawful production, possession, and distribution 
of controlled substances.114 Because serious consequences can arise 
when substances are scheduled,115 the CSA created a multifactorial 
procedure with various administrative safeguards to have a sub-
stance controlled, or added, under the proper schedule.116 Congress, 
through the CSA, demanded careful review of a substance’s medical 
use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability.117 The 
CSA also requires the evaluation and recommendations, with re-
                                                                                                             
 111 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3)–(5). For a more detailed analysis of the regulatory 
structure of the CSA and its classification scheme, see Alex Kreit, Controlled 
Substances, Uncontrolled Law, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 332, 332 (2013) (arguing 
the CSA’s system of scheduling lacks uniformity and stifles much needed re-
search into substances with potential medical uses, particularly those placed in 
Schedule I). 
 112 21 U.S.C. § 811(a); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 162 
(1991); Exec. Order No. 11,727, 3 C.F.R. 785–86 (1971–1975), reprinted as 
amended in 21 U.S.C. § 801 app. at 507–08. 
 113 38 Fed. Reg. § 18,380 (1973). In Touby, the Supreme Court approved this 
subdelegation of power to schedule substances. 500 U.S. at 164. Because the At-
torney General delegated this authority to the DEA Administrator, the term “Ad-
ministrator” will be used in place of the term “Attorney General” throughout the 
remainder of this Comment. 
 114 YEH, supra note 105, at 1. 
 115 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (listing mandatory minimum drug penalties for dif-
ferent controlled substances). 
 116 Under the CSA, the term “control” as defined by section 802(5) means “to 
add a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule under [Sec-
tion 812 of the Act], whether by transfer from another schedule or otherwise.” 
 117 YEH, supra note 105, at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–812). 
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spect to a substance’s proper schedule, from two federal depart-
ments and three federal agencies.118 This “intra-agency coordina-
tion” serves as a system of internal checks in which specific func-
tions are assigned to the appropriate agency.119 For example, the rec-
ommendations made by the Department of Human Health & Ser-
vices are binding on the Administrator as to scientific and medical 
matters because that agency is tasked with protecting the health of 
all Americans.120 
The formal process to schedule a substance begins when the Ad-
ministrator gathers all necessary data and subsequently requests 
from the Secretary of HHS a scientific and medical evaluation and 
recommendation as to whether a substance should be controlled.121 
For such evaluations, HHS must consider eight factors about the 
substance’s potential for abuse, medical use, and dependence liabil-
ity.122 After evaluating these factors, HHS makes a recommendation 
                                                                                                             
 118 The two federal entities involved in the scheduling process are the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services; the specific 
federal agencies are the DEA, the FDA, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse. 
YEH, supra note 105, at 1–2. 
 119 Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 421 
(2015) (describing ways in which an agency’s organizational choices can influ-
ence rulemaking outcomes); cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relation-
ship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 
427–34 (2009) (noting the interaction between internal executive procedures and 
constitutional separation of powers implications). 
 120 About HHS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/
about/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). The recommendation on the initial 
scheduling of a substance is binding only to the extent that if HHS recommends 
that a drug or substance not be controlled, the DEA may not add it to its schedules. 
YEH, supra note 105, at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 811(b)). 
 121 21 U.S.C. § 811(b); see also United States v. Nasir, No. 5:12-CR-102-
JMH, 2013 WL 5373691, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2013). 
 122 Specifically, the eight factors for the scheduling criteria include: (1) the 
substance’s actual or relative potential for abuse; (2) scientific evidence of its 
pharmacological effect, if known; (3) the state of current scientific knowledge 
regarding the drug or other substance; (4) its history and current pattern of abuse; 
(5) the scope, duration, and significance of abuse; (6) what, if any, risk there is to 
the public health; (7) its psychic or physiological dependence liability; and (8) 
whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a currently controlled sub-
stance. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c). 
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as to the appropriate schedule for the substance.123 The Administra-
tor then must consider the same eight factors prior to initiating ad-
ministrative proceedings for control of the substance.124 After the 
Administrator concludes this extensive evaluation, he or she must 
make specific findings about the drug or substance that governs the 
schedule in which it will be placed.125 The Administrator initiates 
proceedings for control of the substance through rulemaking pursu-
ant to the APA, which demands an opportunity for public comment 
and a hearing for all interested parties.126 
B.  Emergency or Temporary Scheduling 
In addition to the formal scheduling procedure, the CSA allows 
for an expedited process by which the Administrator can place a 
drug or substance, on a temporary basis, into Schedule I when doing 
so is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety.127 In-
stead of the eight factors required for permanent scheduling, in a 
temporary scheduling action the Administrator is only required to 
consider three factors with respect to a finding of an imminent haz-
ard.128 These are the substance’s “history and current pattern of 
abuse,” its “scope, duration, and significance of abuse,” and “what, 
if any, risk there is to the public health.”129 In evaluating these fac-
tors, the Administrator must also consider the substance’s “actual 
abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importa-
tion, manufacture, or distribution.”130 
Despite its departure from the formal scheduling process, the 
Administrator must satisfy the requirements of Section 812(b) for 
                                                                                                             
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. § 811(c)(1)–(8) (listing factors the Administrator must consider when 
determining control or removal of a substance from the schedules). 
 125 Id. § 812(b) (“[A] drug or other substance may not be placed in any sched-
ule unless the findings required for such schedule are made with respect to such 
drug or substance.”). 
 126 Id. § 811(a); 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). 
 127 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1); Id. § 811(c)(4)–(6); see also Touby v. United States, 
500 U.S. 160, 163 (1991); YEH, supra note 105, at 2. 
 128 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(3). 
 129 Id. See also Touby, 500 U.S. at 166; YEH, supra note 105, at 2–3. 
 130 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(3). 
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adding a substance to each of the five schedules.131 Thus, as the Su-
preme Court specified, 
apart from the “imminent hazard” determination re-
quired by [Section 811(h)], the [Administrator], if he 
wishes to add temporarily a drug to schedule I, must 
find that it “has a high potential for abuse,” that it 
“has no currently accepted medical use in treatment 
in the United States,” and that “[t]here is a lack of 
accepted safety for use of the drug . . . under medical 
supervision.”132 
Moreover, the Administrator may not issue a temporary sched-
uling order until thirty days after a notice of the proposed scheduling 
is published in the Federal Register.133 The Administrator must then 
transmit notice to the Secretary of HHS and consider any comments 
submitted by the Secretary in response to such scheduling.134 
The most significant difference from the formal scheduling pro-
cess is that compliance with the APA’s notice-and-comment re-
quirements is not necessary under a temporary scheduling action.135 
Thus, it allows the Administrator to bypass, for a limited time, sev-
eral requirements, including an opportunity for public participation. 
The Administrator may temporarily schedule a substance for two 
years, and possibly up to three years, if formal scheduling proce-
dures are initiated.136 Also, a temporary scheduling order is not sub-
ject to judicial review.137 The notion, at least, is that because it fea-
                                                                                                             
 131 Touby, 500 U.S. at 167 (noting that Section 812(b) “speaks in mandatory 
terms, drawing no distinction between permanent and temporary scheduling”). 
 132 Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)). 
 133 21 U.S.C. § 811(1)(A); see also Touby, 500 U.S. at 166. 
 134 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(4); see also Touby, 500 U.S. at 166. 
 135 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1); see also Touby, 500 U.S. at 163 (“Rather than com-
ply with the APA notice-and-hearing provisions, the [Administrator] need provide 
only a 30-day notice of the proposed scheduling in the Federal Register.”). 
 136 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(2). A temporary scheduling order is vacated once the 
substance is scheduled pursuant to the formal scheduling process. Id. § 811(h)(5). 
 137 Id. § 811(h)(6). But see Touby, 500 U.S. at 170 (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(“We must read the [CSA] as preserving judicial review of a temporary schedul-
ing order in the course of a criminal prosecution in order to save the Act’s dele-
gation of lawmaking power from unconstitutionality.”). 
994 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:972 
 
tures fewer procedural requirements, emergency scheduling em-
powers the government to respond faster to the peril posed by dan-
gerous new drugs or substances.138 
1.  PURPOSE 
Congress amended the CSA in 1984 to include the emergency 
scheduling authority.139 This amendment was enacted under the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act140 to combat the designer drug 
problem.141 The purpose for the amendment, confirmed by its legis-
lative history,142 was to allow the Administrator “to control a sub-
stance on a temporary basis without meeting the prior notice and 
hearing requirements,” under the permanent scheduling process, “if 
such action was necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public 
safety.”143 Put simply, this new scheduling authority allowed the 
government to save time and catch alleged drug traffickers faster.144 
As Justice O’Connor explained, 
[i]t takes time to comply with [the formal scheduling] 
procedural requirements. From the time when law 
enforcement officials identify a dangerous new drug, 
it typically takes 6 to 12 months to add it to one of 
the schedules. Drug traffickers were able to take ad-
vantage of this time gap by designing drugs that were 
                                                                                                             
 138 See Touby, 500 U.S. at 164. 
 139 Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 508, 
98 Stat. 2070, 2071 (codified as amended at 21. U.S.C. § 811(h)). 
 140 Pub. L. No 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18 U.S.C.). 
 141 Touby, 500 U.S. at 163; see also Note, The Emergence and Emergency of 
Designer Drugs: Subdelegation of the Power Temporarily to Schedule in Light of 
United States v. Spain, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 257, 258–61 (1988) (discussing the 
history of designer drugs). 
 142 See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
 143 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 264 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3446; see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-835, pt. 1, at 11–13 (1984). 
 144 See United States v. Emerson, 846 F.2d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wiggins, 
J., dissenting) (“I believe the plain intent of Congress was to establish an expe-
dited system of review in order to criminalize the possession, manufacturing, and 
distribution of newly-developed ‘designer’ drugs before they became public 
health hazards.”). 
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similar in pharmacological effect to scheduled sub-
stances but differed slightly in chemical composi-
tion, so that existing schedules did not apply to them. 
These “designer drugs” were developed and widely 
marketed long before the Government was able to 
schedule them and initiate prosecutions.145 
The crux of the emergency scheduling authority is a requirement 
that the scheduling of a substance be necessary to avoid an imminent 
hazard to public safety.146 Yet, the CSA does not define “imminent 
hazard,” nor does it reference a potential definition elsewhere in the 
Code.147 Insight into the meaning of this term can be found in con-
gressional discussions during the drafting and consideration of the 
statutory provision. In response to questions presented by Congress 
concerning the emergency scheduling authority, then-Administrator 
Francis Mullen specified: 
The use of the term “imminent hazard to the public 
safety” is based on several factors. The “imminent 
hazard” implies a need for immediate response to a 
drug trafficking and abuse situation that has occurred 
with such rapidity and with insufficient warning that 
normal control mechanisms would result in a large 
number of deaths and injuries or the continuance of 
an uncontrolled trafficking situation . . . . The burden 
would be on the Government to prove that such an 
urgency exists and that the public safety would be 
jeopardized during the period that a drug would re-
main uncontrolled during routine scheduling ac-
tion.148 
To be sure, the menace of a sudden drug trafficking and abuse 
epidemic was a grave concern for the DEA and its primary objective 
                                                                                                             
 145 Touby, 500 U.S. at 163 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 264). 
 146 21 U.S.C. § 811(h) (2012). 
 147 Id. § 802 (no reference to “imminent hazard” in definitions). 
 148 Diversion of Prescription Drugs to Illegal Channels and Dangerous Drug 
Diversion Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4698 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 401 (1985) (letter of Francis M. Mul-
len, Jr., Adm’r, DEA) [hereinafter Mullen Letter]. 
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for the emergency scheduling authority.149 The DEA claimed, “it is 
the total drug trafficking and abuse situation not a finite number of 
deaths and injuries that would define an imminent hazard.”150 
As an example of a situation of imminent harm, Administrator 
Mullen pointed to the synthetic drugs being produced in clandestine 
laboratories.151 The Administrator discussed two analogs of the hal-
lucinogen PCP (phencyclidine)152 that produced similar qualitative 
effects.153 When regulation of PCP was increased during the late 
1970s, clandestine operators turned to these non-controlled analogs 
to succeed in the illegal drug trade.154 Because these PCP analogs 
were not scheduled substances under the CSA, law enforcement 
could not prosecute the traffickers selling the drug analogs on the 
street as PCP.155 
In retrospect, the DEA claimed that had the emergency schedul-
ing authority been in place, these substances could have been con-
trolled at least ten months and possibly twelve months earlier, thus 
allowing law enforcement to prosecute these traffickers.156 The 
DEA maintained that the emergency scheduling authority would be 
“used infrequently and only in the most extreme cases where the 
time needed for the routine scheduling process would work to the 
detriment of the public safety.”157 
2.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A Senate committee report sheds light on what Congress in-
tended when it enacted the emergency scheduling authority.158 Sim-
ilar to the concerns expressed by the DEA, Congress recognized that 
permanent scheduling could take from six to twelve months, during 
                                                                                                             
 149 See id. 
 150 Id. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151 Id. at 401. 
 152 See STEPHEN B. KLEIN & B. MICHAEL THORNE, BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
170–71 (2007) (explaining that hallucinogens, like PCP, can severely alter a per-
son’s state of consciousness, including perceptions of time and distance). 
 153 Mullen Letter, supra note 148, at 402. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 404. 
 158 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 264 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3446. 
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which time “enforcement actions against traffickers are severely 
limited and a serious health problem may arise.”159 Thus, Congress 
enacted the emergency scheduling authority to allow the DEA Ad-
ministrator to temporarily schedule a substance without “await[ing] 
the exhaustive medical and scientific determinations ordinarily re-
quired when a drug is being considered for control.”160 The emer-
gency scheduling authority was designed to allow the Administrator 
“to respond quickly to protect the public from drugs of abuse that 
appear in the illicit traffic too rapidly to be effectively handled under 
the lengthy routine control procedures.”161 
During floor debates, members of Congress stated that the emer-
gency scheduling authority provides “an expedited procedure to 
control chemicals that mimic the effects of hallucinogenic drugs, 
such as PCP,”162 and “will enable us to rapidly control newly devel-
oped chemicals, sometimes called designer drugs, that are similar to 
controlled drugs.”163 In a similar vein, a House of Representatives 
committee hearing report highlights as an issue of serious concern 
to the legislature: A “substantial development of new psychotropic 
substances by underground chemists seeking to evade the controls 
on specific compounds.”164 
3.  RELEVANT AGENCY DECISIONAL PRECEDENT 
The emergency scheduling authority has been an indispensable 
law enforcement tool used by the DEA to control highly dangerous 
substances.165 The DEA envisioned the emergency scheduling au-
thority as a tool to target two specific types of substances: (1) new 
drugs of abuse that are of clandestine origin and (2) newly abused 
                                                                                                             
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 265. 
 161 Id. at 264–65. 
 162 130 CONG. REC. H9679 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1984) (statement of Rep. 
Hughes). 
 163 Id. at H9682 (statement of Rep. Rodino). 
 164 H.R. REP. NO. 98-835, pt. 1, at 9 (1984). 
 165 Since 1984, the DEA has invoked the emergency scheduling authority to 
schedule approximately sixty-three substances. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DRUG ENF’T 
ADMIN., LISTS OF: SCHEDULING ACTIONS; CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES; 
REGULATED CHEMICALS (2018), https://tinyurl.com/yagncyx9. 
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drugs that are marketed in an uncontrolled status.166 A review of 
substances scheduled under the emergency scheduling authority 
highlights flaws in the DEA’s action to schedule kratom—a natural, 
botanical substance. 
In 1985, the DEA first invoked the emergency scheduling au-
thority to control 3-methylfentanyl, a synthetic analog to fentanyl.167 
The DEA’s notice referenced legislative history of the then-newly 
enacted emergency scheduling authority.168 Perhaps wary of its new 
authority, the DEA emphasized that fentanyl analogs were “exam-
ples of such designer drugs which Congress clearly intended to sub-
ject to the emergency scheduling authority as imminent hazards to 
the public safety.”169 To meet its burden of proof, the DEA cited 
overwhelming evidence that the fentanyl analog was attributable to 
at least thirty-one overdose deaths, of which twenty-six had oc-
curred just eight months prior to the proposed scheduling.170 More-
over, the DEA emphasized that impurities, precursors, and by-prod-
ucts discovered in samples of the fentanyl analog showed that it 
originated from clandestine laboratories.171 
The DEA exercised the emergency scheduling authority to con-
trol various synthetic analogs to the notorious rave or “club drug” 
                                                                                                             
 166 Diversion of Prescription Drugs to Illegal Channels and Dangerous Drug 
Diversion Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4698 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 129 (1985) (statement of Gene R. 
Haislip, Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Off. of Diversion Control, Drug Enf’t Admin.). 
 167 Schedules of Controlled Substances; Temporary Placement of 3-
Methylfentanyl Into Schedule I, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,690 (proposed Mar. 25, 1985) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308) [hereinafter Scheduling of Fentanyl]. Fentanyl 
is a narcotic analgesic in Schedule II of the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012). 
 168 The scheduling notice cited House Report 98-835: “This new [emergency 
scheduling] procedure is intended by the Committee to apply to what has been 
called ‘designer drugs,’ new chemical analogs or variations of existing controlled 
substances, or other new substances, which have a psychedelic, stimulant or de-
pressant effect and have a high potential for abuse.” Scheduling of Fentanyl, supra 
note 167, at 11,690. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 11,691. Twenty of the overdose deaths occurred in the San Francisco 
Bay area where the fentanyl analog had been identified in powder samples. The 
scheduling notice also emphasized that “concentrations of the fentanyl-like sub-
stance in the body fluids of the overdose victims, in many cases, were extremely 
low (less than 1 ng/ml) which is consistent with the use of an extremely potent 
substance.” Id. 
 171 Id. 
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MDMA, or ecstasy.172 In 1987, the DEA first controlled two 
MDMA analogs by temporarily placing N-ethyl MDA and N-hy-
droxy MDA into Schedule I of the CSA.173 Among other relevant 
evidence, the DEA found that both substances were produced in 
clandestine laboratories and shared similar pharmacological effects 
with MDMA.174 As evidence of the substances’ adverse effects on 
public health and safety, the DEA pointed to incidents where the 
substances were found in the blood of several persons stopped by 
police for speeding, for driving while intoxicated, or for car acci-
dents.175 Similarly, there were reported instances of emergency 
room admissions of person who used these substances and whose 
reason for admission ranged from bizarre behavior to loss of con-
sciousness.176 
The emergency scheduling authority was newly invoked by the 
DEA to control five synthetic cannabinoids.177 These substances are 
a class of chemical compounds biologically similar to THC, an ac-
tive compound in marijuana, and are abused for their psychoactive 
properties.178 In its final scheduling order, the DEA declared that the 
rise of these five synthetic cannabinoids represents a recent phenom-
enon in the U.S. designer drug market.179 These substances are typ-
ically laced in herbal incense products and plant food, thus making 
                                                                                                             
 172 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) is a synthetic drug that 
alters mood and perception. It is chemically like both stimulants and hallucino-
gens, producing feelings of increased energy, pleasure, emotional warmth, and 
distorted sensory and time perception. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, 
DRUGFACTS: MDMA (ECSTASY/MOLLY) (rev. Oct. 2016), https://tinyurl.com/
hhxbpc5. 
 173 Schedules of Controlled Substances; Temporary Placement of N-ethyl 
MDA and N-hydroxy MDA into Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 52 
Fed. Reg. 30,175 (proposed Aug. 13, 1987) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308) 
[hereinafter Scheduling of MDMA Synthetic Analogs]. 
 174 Id. at 30,176. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Five Syn-
thetic Cannabinoids into Schedule I, 76 Fed. Reg. 11,075 (proposed Mar. 1, 2011) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308) [hereinafter Scheduling of Five Synthetic Can-
nabinoids]. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 11,076. 
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their discovery by law enforcement challenging.180 Evidence from 
U.S. poison centers showed a spike in the number of calls related to 
synthetic cannabinoids—from 112 calls to over 2,700 calls—all dur-
ing a nine-month span.181 
In February 2016, the DEA scheduled one of the latest synthetic 
cannabinoids to hit the illicit market, named MAB-CHMINACA.182 
As part of its final order, the DEA stated its belief that synthetic 
cannabinoids were first introduced into the designer drug market in 
Europe as herbal incense before their initial discovery by U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection in late 2008.183 These designer drug 
products, laced with synthetic cannabinoids, are often sold under the 
guise of herbal incense or potpourri.184 Traffickers continue to con-
trive ways to circumvent law enforcement efforts to control these 
harmful substances, thus showing a lack of regard for public health 
and safety.185 As evidence of the imminent hazard to public safety 
posed by MAB-CHMINACA, the DEA pointed to state public 
health entities’ reporting of over 2,000 overdoses and at least thirty-
three deaths across eleven states that were attributed to the misuse 
of synthetic cannabinoids.186 
Although these cases of emergency scheduling involve distinct 
chemical compounds, they share one common thread: These sub-
stances were viewed as rapidly emerging synthetic analogs of cur-
rently controlled substances with a recognized high potential for 
abuse.187 Because these substances were befitting of the emergency 
scheduling authority as imminent hazards to public safety, the DEA 
                                                                                                             
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. Specifically, on March 24, 2010, the American Association of Poison 
Control Centers reported that, since 2009, U.S. poison centers had received 112 
calls from fifteen states related to synthetic cannabinoids. Just nine months later, 
the number of calls increased to over 2,7000 from forty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia. Id. 
 182 Schedules of Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of the Syn-
thetic Cannabinoid MAB-CHMINACA into Schedule I, 81 Fed. Reg. 6,171 (pro-
posed Feb. 5, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 1308) [hereinafter Scheduling of 
MAB-CHMINACA]. 
 183 Id. at 6,172. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 6,173. 
 187 See supra text accompanying notes 167, 173, 177, 182. 
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judiciously complied with Congress’ directive and properly exer-
cised such authority without the need for any justification for its ac-
tions—until now, with its precipitous scheduling of kratom. 
III.  KRATOM DOES NOT MEET THE LEGAL CRITERIA                 
FOR EMERGENCY SCHEDULING 
With this backdrop, the purpose of the emergency scheduling 
authority becomes clear. It was enacted to keep designer drugs—
that is, newly synthesized analogs of popular drugs of abuse con-
trolled under the CSA188—off the streets while the permanent sched-
uling procedure was initiated.189 But the DEA has never invoked this 
authority to control a natural, botanical substance because such a 
substance is not one that Congress intended for the emergency 
scheduling authority.190 As will be discussed, the DEA has failed to 
present a valid justification to invoke the emergency scheduling au-
thority to schedule kratom under the statutory requirements of the 
CSA. 
A.  Strike One: The DEA Has Not Met Its Burden of Showing that 
Kratom Represents an Imminent Hazard to Public Safety 
The emergency scheduling authority allows for control of a sub-
stance only when necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public 
safety.191 The burden is on the DEA to prove that an urgency exists 
and that public safety would be endangered were the substance left 
uncontrolled during the period of ordinary scheduling procedure.192 
As shown, the DEA’s three-factor analysis and evidence presented 
on its finding of an imminent hazard with respect to kratom are in-
sufficient to overcome such a high statutory burden. 
                                                                                                             
 188 United States v. Reece, 956 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (W.D. La. 2013) (“A 
controlled substance analogue is a ‘designer drug’ that resembles a controlled sub-
stance in molecular structure and actual or intended physiological effect.”). 
 189 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(5) (2012) (an order issued under the temporary sched-
uling authority “shall be vacated upon the conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking 
proceeding initiated under [the formal scheduling process] with respect to such 
substance”). 
 190 See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
 191 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1). 
 192 Mullen Letter, supra note 148, at 401. 
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1.  KRATOM DOES NOT HAVE A HIGH POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE 
For decades, kratom has been consumed worldwide by different 
persons to treat various health concerns.193 Despite its recent popu-
larity in the United States, the use of kratom can hardly be consid-
ered a new craze in the illicit drug market. The situation that has 
developed over the past years with kratom consumers in North 
America does not rise to the level of an uncontrolled trafficking sit-
uation. Moreover, the safe and sensible use of kratom by American 
consumers does not establish actual abuse. Simply put, kratom does 
not have a high potential for abuse, as the DEA claimed in its sched-
uling notice.194 
Although referenced throughout the CSA, the term “abuse” is 
not defined.195 Some guidance for analyzing a substance’s abuse for 
purposes of scheduling can be gleaned from the Act’s legislative 
history.196 Congress emphasized that “a key criterion for controlling 
a substance . . . is the substance’s potential for abuse.”197 When re-
ferring to the term “potential for abuse,” the legislature looked to the 
definition contained in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.198 
Under this definition, a finding that a substance has a potential for 
abuse is made when: 
(1) there is evidence that individuals are taking the 
[substance] in amounts sufficient to create a hazard 
to their health or to the safety of other individuals or 
of the community or (2) there is significant diversion 
of the [substance] from legitimate channels or (3) in-
dividuals are taking the [substance] on their own in-
itiative rather than [based on medical advice from a 
licensed practitioner] or (4) the drug or drugs con-
taining such a substance are new drugs so related in 
their action to a drug or drugs already listed as having 
                                                                                                             
 193 Kratom: Survey of the Literature, supra note 70, at 42 (describing myriad 
uses of kratom). 
 194 Kratom Scheduling Notice, supra note 15, at 59,933. 
 195 21 U.S.C. § 802 (no reference to “abuse” in definitions). 
 196 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, H.R. 
REP. NO. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4566, 4601. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
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a potential for abuse to make it likely that the [sub-
stance] will have the same potentiality for abuse.199 
When considering these factors, one conclusion arises: Kratom does 
not have a high potential for abuse akin to currently controlled sub-
stances like fentanyl.200 
First, there is limited evidence that persons are consuming 
kratom in amounts sufficient to create a hazard to their health or to 
the safety of others around them.201 Indeed, there have been no re-
ported overdose deaths related to kratom alone.202 The DEA’s reli-
ance on a report published by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention on kratom exposures reported to U.S. poison centers re-
veals how the DEA’s notice is grounded on flawed reasoning.203 The 
DEA concluded that the CDC’s report is evidence that there is an 
increase in the number of persons abusing kratom.204 But a closer 
look at the 660 calls reported by the CDC reveal that many, if not 
all, adverse medical outcomes were associated with consumption of 
                                                                                                             
 199 Id. 
 200 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (listing fentanyl in Schedule II). 
 201 As Dr. Jack Henningfield, a leading expert in addiction medicine, con-
cluded in a 127-page analysis, “kratom has a low potential for abuse and a low 
dependence liability and there is insufficient evidence of personal harm, adverse 
health effects or detriment to the public health to warrant control under the CSA.” 
ASSESSMENT OF KRATOM UNDER THE CSA EIGHT FACTORS AND SCHEDULING 
RECOMMENDATION, PINNEY ASSOCIATES 65 (Nov. 28, 2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/ybmxoqwk. 
 202 Marcus L. Warner et al., The Pharmacology and Toxicology of Kratom: 
From Traditional Herb to Drug of Abuse, 130 INT’L J. LEGAL MED. 127, 134 
(2016) (noting that there is no solid evidence that kratom has caused death). 
 203 Mehruba Anwar et al., Notes from the Field: Kratom (Mitragyna speciosa) 
Exposures Reported to Poison Centers – United States, 2010–2015, 65 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 748, 748 (2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/ya3srmkp (finding the number of calls received by U.S. poison centers 
on reported kratom exposures increased tenfold from twenty-six in 2010 to 263 
in 2015). 
 204 Kratom Three Factor Analysis, supra note 75, at 17 (“Evidence from poi-
son control centers in the United States also shows that there is an increase in the 
number of individuals abusing kratom.”). 
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substances other than kratom.205 The DEA’s analysis of poison con-
trol data references a single death involving exposure to kratom, par-
oxetine (an antidepressant), and lamotrigine (an anticonvulsant and 
mood stabilizer).206 The 660 calls received by U.S. poison centers in 
a six-year period is quite telling when compared to the number of 
calls about other uncontrolled substances. To put that number in per-
spective, a total of 14,919 exposures to hand sanitizer, which can 
cause alcohol poisoning, were reported during a seven-month span 
in 2015 alone.207 The DEA’s reliance on data from U.S. poison cen-
ters does not establish that kratom alone causes an imminent harm 
or even a substantial likelihood of an immediate threat of abuse. 
Second, there is overwhelming evidence that kratom has been 
legally bought as a botanical substance for decades in the United 
States and abroad.208 As discussed in more detail, kratom is not be-
ing diverted from legitimate channels into the illicit drug market like 
other substances that Congress considered when it drafted the 
CSA.209 As to the third consideration, it is difficult to evaluate the 
extent to which persons consume kratom on their own initiative ra-
ther than based on medical advice because kratom is a product that 
is widely available online without the need for a prescription.210 
Nor does kratom mimic a drug already scheduled as having a 
high potential for abuse under the CSA.211 While some studies have 
shown that kratom exhibits opioid-like activity, a more recent mo-
lecular study found that the primary alkaloids present in kratom—
                                                                                                             
 205 Anwar et al., supra note 203, at 748. The most commonly reported sub-
stances consumed in combination with kratom were ethanol, other botanicals, 
benzodiazepines, narcotics, and acetaminophen. Id. 
 206 Kratom Three Factor Analysis, supra note 75, at 19, tbl. 2 (citing Anwar 
et al., supra note 203, at 748). 
 207 AM. ASS’N OF POISON CONTROL CTRS., ALERTS: Hand Sanitizer, 
http://www.aapcc.org/alerts/hand-sanitizer/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). 
 208 See Prozialeck et al., supra note 49, at 794 (noting that a wide variety of 
kratom products are readily available from Internet-based suppliers and specialty 
stores). 
 209 See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
 210 See Prozialeck et al., supra note 49, at 794. 
 211 See id. at 797 (noting that “many anecdotal reports suggest that [kratom] 
may be less addictive than classical opioids”); All Things Considered, supra note 
1 (explaining that the main chemical in kratom, mitragynine, binds to some of the 
same receptors as opioids, providing some pain relief and feelings of euphoria but 
not the same high) (statement of pharmacologist David Kroll). 
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mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitrgynine—are an unusual class of opi-
oid receptor modulators with distinct pharmacological properties.212 
The study found that mitragynine binds to several non-opioid recep-
tors, thus exhibiting both agonist and antagonist effects at the main 
opioid receptors in the central nervous system.213 In sum, research 
shows that the value of kratom warrants careful evaluation to deter-
mine its true potential as an alternative in both pain management and 
opioid addiction.214 As one research study puts it: “[A]ny blanket 
illegalization of kratom poses the danger of casting out the baby with 
the bathwater.”215 
2.  KRATOM USE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE DIVERSION FROM 
LEGITIMATE CHANNELS 
The DEA’s analysis confounds evidence on the widespread use 
of kratom with actual abuse.216 To be sure, there is substantial evi-
dence on the worldwide use of kratom because it is a botanical sub-
stance with numerous therapeutic benefits.217 But the DEA’s as-
sumption that evidence on the use of kratom constitutes actual abuse 
is a non sequitur. The DEA’s analysis is doubtful because it fails to 
recognize that kratom has been available for many years through 
legitimate channels.218 
                                                                                                             
 212 Andrew C. Kruegel et al., Synthetic and Receptor Signaling Explorations 
of the Mitragyna Alkaloids: Mitragynine as an Atypical Molecular Framework 
for Opioid Receptor Modulators, 138 J. AM. CHEM. SOC’Y 6754, 6754 (2016). 
 213 Id. at 6762. Drugs can function as agonists or antagonists to either help or 
inhibit the transmission of neural impulses. Those that mimic or enhance the ac-
tivities of a neurotransmitter are called agonists, whereas those that block or in-
hibit the effects of a neurotransmitter are known as antagonists. KLEIN & THORNE, 
supra note 152, at 152. As to the other kratom alkaloid, the study found that 7-
hydroxymitragynine is not present in all extracts of plant material, so the potential 
influence of this compound to the effects of kratom is not typical. Kruegel et al., 
supra note 212, at 6762. 
 214 Kratom: Survey of the Literature, supra note 70, at 45. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Kratom Three Factor Analysis, supra note 75, at 12–14 (citing kratom’s 
increased availability and widespread distribution as evidence of increased 
abuse). 
 217 See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 218 Id. 
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Small business owners who cater to Americans consuming 
kratom for its health benefits can hardly be equated to the drug traf-
fickers the DEA originally intended to prosecute with the aid of the 
emergency scheduling authority.219 Thus, an increase in kratom use 
is not a proper indicator of an uncontrolled trafficking situation for 
which the DEA sought enactment of the emergency scheduling au-
thority.220 Further, American suppliers of kratom are not clandes-
tinely importing, manufacturing, or distributing the botanical sub-
stance. To the contrary, they are openly selling kratom in health food 
stores and smoke shops across the country.221 
3.  KRATOM IS ALLEVIATING A PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT,      
NOT CREATING ONE 
In both its notice of intent and three-factor analysis, the DEA 
claims there have been numerous deaths associated with kratom,222 
yet not one report in the scientific literature cited by the DEA found 
that kratom is lethal by itself. These published studies all describe 
ingestion of kratom together with pharmaceuticals or controlled sub-
stances.223 A recent publication confirmed the finding of other pub-
lished studies: “Although death has been attributed to kratom use, 
                                                                                                             
 219 Mullen Letter, supra note 148, at 401–02. 
 220 See id. 
 221 See Kristy Totten, Las Vegas Business Owner Fights Kratom Ban, NEV. 
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 26, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/y8gpczyn. 
 222 Kratom Scheduling Notice, supra note 15, at 59,932; Three Factor Analy-
sis on Kratom, supra note 75, at 21. 
 223 Ritva Karinen et al., An Accidental Poisoning with Mitragynine, 245 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e29, e29 (2014) (reporting the death of a middle-aged man 
in Norway whose autopsy findings revealed therapeutic concentrations of zopi-
clone, citalopram, and lamotrigine in the blood, as well as mitragynine); Robert 
Kronstrand et al., Unintentional Fatal Intoxications with Mitragynine and O-
Desmethyltramadol from the Herbal Blend Krypton, 35 J. ANALYTICAL 
TOXICOLOGY 242, 243, 246 (2011) (attributing nine deaths in Sweden to Krypton, 
which is a blend of mitragynine, or kratom, and O-desmethyltramadol, the main 
metabolite of the commercial opioid Tramadol, and also noting that several other 
psychotropic drugs were detected in each victim and could have contributed to 
death); Iain M. McIntyre et al., Mitragynine ‘Kratom’ Related Fatality: A Case 
Report with Postmortem Concentrations, 39 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 152, 
155 (2015) (reporting the death of a twenty-four-year-old man who ingested ther-
apeutic concentrations of venlafaxine, diphenhydramine, mirtazapine, and etha-
nol, or alcohol, in addition to mitragynine); Michael F. Neerman et al., A Drug 
Fatality Involving Kratom, 58 J. FORENSIC SCIS. S278, S279 (2013) (reporting the 
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there is no solid evidence that kratom was the sole contributor to an 
individual’s death.”224 Thus, it is not reasonable to assume, as the 
DEA has, that kratom is the lone culprit for each of these reported 
deaths, especially when some of the other reported substances, like 
the sleeping pill temazepam, have been linked to an increased risk 
of death.225 
Throughout its three-factor analysis, the DEA relies on a CDC 
report on kratom incidents related to U.S. poison centers.226 Yet, the 
DEA failed to fact-check the sources cited in the report. In the two-
page report, the CDC claims that incidents have linked kratom use 
with deaths, citing two sources for its assertion.227 But both sources 
reported no actual deaths from kratom use.228 The CDC publication 
also reports that deaths have been attributed to kratom in the United 
States, but it only cites to a newspaper article for this unfounded 
claim.229 The DEA overlooked significant discrepancies in the 
sources it cited and relied upon to reach its decision that kratom 
poses an imminent hazard to public safety. 
                                                                                                             
autopsy findings of a seventeen-year-old male with elevated concentrations of 
dextromethorphan, diphenhydramine, temazepam, and 7-amino-clonazepam in 
the blood, as well as kratom). 
 224 Warner et al., supra note 202, at 134. 
 225 Daniel F. Kripke et al., Hypnotics’ Association with Mortality or Cancer: 
A Matched Cohort Study, 2 BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2012), http://bmjopen.bmj.com/con-
tent/2/1/e000850.full (finding that patients receiving prescriptions for temazepam 
and other hypnotics suffered over four times the mortality as the matched hyp-
notic-free control patients); Alice Park, Study: Sleeping Pills Linked with Early 
Death, TIME (Feb. 28, 2012), https://tinyurl.com/7jrqzfz. 
 226 Kratom Three Factor Analysis, supra note 75, at 10–12, 17, 19–21. 
 227 Anwar et al., supra note 203, at 748. 
 228 Mathias B. Forrester, Kratom Exposures Reported to Texas Poison Cen-
ters, 32 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 396, 397 (2013) (reporting “there were no 
deaths”); Satariya Trakulsrichai et al., Kratom Abuse in Ramathibodi Poison Cen-
ter, Thailand: A Five-Year Experience, 45 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 404, 406 
(2013) (reporting “no mortality in this study”). 
 229 Anwar et al., supra note 203, at 748. In turn, the newspaper article reported 
the suicide of a twenty-two-year-old male by a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Erin 
Coleman, Anguished Parents Say Exotic Drug Kratom Is the Cause of Son’s Sui-
cide, ATLANTA J. CONST. (May 19, 2015), https://tinyurl.com/yaebwvy4. Such 
news is not sufficient, let alone actual, causal evidence of kratom’s public health 
threat. 
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Further, the DEA has frowned upon the use of kratom as a re-
placement for other opioids.230 As far as the DEA is concerned, the 
fact that people are weaning themselves from opioid addiction with 
a less dangerous, naturally-derived substance is irrelevant. But this 
is evidence of kratom’s growing reputation as a potential antidote to 
the menacing opioid epidemic in the United States.231 Indeed, many 
users who have incorporated kratom into their lives have found a 
new hope in managing their opioid addiction, while others look to 
the plant as a therapeutic alternative to the prescription painkillers 
that ruined their lives.232 A sample from the over 23,000 comments 
posted as part of the DEA’s modified comment process corroborates 
kratom’s therapeutic benefits: 
Kratom has allowed me to get off prescription drugs 
that were causing me a lot of harm. Additionally, I 
now have less anxiety allowing me to be a better fa-
ther, a better employer and a better person. Kratom 
has saved my life plain and simple. And it has never 
once harmed me in any way.233 
*  *  * 
I use kratom for inoperable back pain and have been 
successfully using it to reduce [the] need for syn-
thetic opiates like hydrocodone. Kratom has proven 
                                                                                                             
 230 Kratom Scheduling Notice, supra note 15, at 59,930. (“In the United 
States, kratom is misused to self-treat chronic pain and opioid withdrawal symp-
toms, with users reporting its effect to be comparable to prescription opioids.”). 
 231 Saskia de Melker & Melanie Saltzman, If Kratom Helps Opioid Addicts, 
Why Might DEA Outlaw It?, PBS: NEWSHOUR (Jan. 15, 2017), https://ti-
nyurl.com/z23lrmq. 
 232 All Things Considered, supra note 1; Alexa Tsoulis-Reay, The Intriguing 
Therapeutic Potential of a Little-Known Plant from Southeast Asia, THE CUT (Jan. 
27, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/zhjhpda (reporting the success stories of three 
kratom users across the country). 
 233 Comment on FR Doc # 2016-24659, DEA Proposed Rule: Schedules of 
Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Mitragynine and 7-Hy-
droxymitragynine into Schedule I; Withdrawal, Comment Submitted by Ryan 
Richardson, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=DEA-2016-0015-8577. 
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to me personally to be a safe, reasonable alterna-
tive . . . . Banning this benevolent herb would, to me, 
represent a real setback.234 
*  *  * 
I was addicted to opiates for years, kratom gave me 
the means to stop using opiates without the crippling 
side effects of withdraw[a]ls. I originally was pre-
scribed opiate painkillers by my doctor for joint pain 
due to arthritis without knowing the grip they would 
have on me. Over time I lost my family over the ef-
fects of opiates, kratom gave me my life back, I’ve 
been able to maintain a normal life with the help of 
kratom.235 
These comments show that the rise in kratom use in the United 
States is partly in response to the havoc that prescription opioids 
have caused many persons. While conceding the abuse of prescrip-
tion opioids,236 the DEA failed to acknowledge the adverse impact 
that the proposed emergency scheduling of kratom would produce 
on the overall public health. Persons relying on kratom to self-treat 
their opioid addiction will have one grim decision to make: Continue 
using kratom and face the possibility of criminal charges, or revert 
to the same prescription opioids that ruined their lives.237 Some 
                                                                                                             
 234 Comment on FR Doc # 2016-24659, DEA Proposed Rule: Schedules of 
Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Mitragynine and 7-Hy-
droxymitragynine into Schedule I; Withdrawal, Comment Submitted by Shawn 
Hamilton, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/doc-
ument?D=DEA-2016-0015-7324. 
 235 Comment on FR Doc # 2016-24659, DEA Proposed Rule: Schedules of 
Controlled Substances: Temporary Placement of Mitragynine and 7-Hy-
droxymitragynine into Schedule I; Withdrawal, Comment Submitted by Eric 
Vanvliet, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/doc-
ument?D=DEA-2016-0015-6167. 
 236 Kratom Three Factor Analysis, supra note 75, at 2 (“The well-documented 
misuse and abuse of opioids and their impact on communities is a public health 
and safety epidemic in the United States.”). 
 237 Karisa Rowland is one such person who would rather face criminal charges 
than return to prescription painkillers: “I’m the one in pain. The people making 
these laws, they’re not the ones going through this pain; they’re not the ones 
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kratom advocates have already faced this catch-22 in the seven 
states that have banned kratom, including some states that have in-
correctly classified the herbal supplement as an opiate derivative or 
synthetic drug.238 Although it is too early to predict whether these 
state kratom bans will impact overdose deaths from prescription opi-
oids, a county in Alabama witnessed 103 overdose deaths during the 
first half of 2016, coinciding with the onset of the state’s kratom 
ban.239 
B.  Strike Two: Kratom Is Not a Substance that Congress Intended 
to Control with the Emergency Scheduling Authority 
Congress envisioned the emergency scheduling authority as an 
emergency control.240 Thus, the legislature enacted this authority to 
be used only if a substance creates an imminent hazard to public 
safety.241 Kratom is neither a new drug that appeared too rapidly to 
be addressed by ordinary scheduling procedures242 nor a new de-
signer drug created by underground chemists seeking to evade DEA 
controls under the CSA—as Congress considered during enactment 
of the emergency scheduling authority.243 
The finding of an imminent hazard serves to justify the DEA’s 
action to bypass the administrative safeguards of the formal sched-
uling process, including the public’s participation in the agency’s 
                                                                                                             
whose families have broken up. I found life and I have no intention of letting it 
go.” All Things Considered, supra note 1. 
 238 ALA. CODE § 20-3-23 (2016) (listing kratom compounds as synthetic drugs 
under Schedule I); ARK. ADMIN. CODE § 007.07.2 (West 2016) (listing kratom 
compounds as opium derivatives under Schedule I); IND. CODE § 35-31.5-2-321 
(2016) (listing kratom compounds as synthetic drugs); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-
17-4521(West 2015); 21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-2.08 (listing kratom under 
Schedule I); VT. ADMIN. CODE 12-5-23:4.0 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 961.14 (2016). 
 239 Carol Robinson, Jeffco Sees 25 Heroin, Fentanyl Deaths in June; 103 Fa-
tal Overdoses So Far in 2016, AL.COM (July 11, 2016), https://ti-
nyurl.com/zd4ljp7. 
 240 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 264 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3446. 
 241 21 U.S.C. § 811(h) (2012). 
 242 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 264–65. In fact, kratom use dates back to 1836. Ei-
senman, supra note 54, at 66. The plant was first described by a Dutch botanist, 
Pieter Willem Korthals, while working for the Dutch East India Company from 
1830 to 1837. Id. at 59. 
 243 H.R. REP. NO. 98-835, pt. 1, at 9 (1984). 
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decisionmaking.244 Thus, the emergency scheduling authority en-
sures the creation of a balance between public safety and public par-
ticipation.245 Congress decided that public safety takes preference 
over the democratic process inherent in the CSA, through the re-
quirements of the APA, only in exigent circumstances.246 Absent 
such circumstances, the public’s participation in the DEA’s decision 
making must prevail.247 Indeed, this specific stance was endorsed by 
U.S. Senators who reached out to the Administrator and urged the 
DEA to take appropriate steps to delay the kratom ban to allow for 
a public comment period.248 The Senators reiterated: 
Congress has established a specific set of review pro-
tocols for scheduling decisions . . . that allows for the 
full engagement of consumers, researchers, health 
professionals, law enforcement officials, and other 
stakeholders. Given the long reported history of 
Kratom use, coupled with the public’s sentiment that 
it is a safe alternative to prescription opioids, we be-
lieve using the regular review process would provide 
for a much-needed discussion among all stakehold-
ers.249 
Because kratom has been a widely accessible botanical sub-
stance for years in the United States, there is no indication that 
kratom is being diverted in the manner Congress foresaw when it 
enacted the emergency scheduling authority.250 Congress was con-
cerned with the abuse of legitimate pharmaceutical drugs and their 
                                                                                                             
 244 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 163 (1991). 
 245 Grinspoon v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 828 F.2d 881, 891 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting 
that “Congress has already done the balancing and determined that the risk of 
ongoing abuse amounting to an ‘imminent hazard to the public safety’ justifies 
temporary scheduling without a hearing”). 
 246 United States v. Reece, 956 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 (W.D. La. 2013) (“When 
Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 811(h), it created a procedure that is, in essence, an 
exception to the general procedural requirements of the [APA] and the Congres-
sional Review Act.”). 
 247 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2012) (requiring an opportunity for a hearing pursuant 
to APA rulemaking procedures). 
 248 Senate Letter to DEA, supra note 90. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
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diversion from legitimate channels.251 Some of the principal ave-
nues of diversion that Congress considered include the establish-
ment of sham clinics for “distributing prescription drugs or issuing 
prescriptions for such drugs under the cover of a legitimate medical 
practice,” and also the “development of new psychotropic sub-
stances by underground chemists seeking to evade the controls on 
specific compounds.”252 Neither of these categories of diversion ap-
ply to kratom because it is a botanical substance that is openly sold 
in legitimate businesses across the United States.253 
C.  Strike Three: The Application of the Emergency Scheduling 
Authority to Kratom Is a Significant Departure from Relevant 
Agency Decisional Precedent 
While it is well-settled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not 
bind administrative agencies as it does courts,254 uniformity and 
consistency of agency decisions is essential to dispel any situations 
of arbitrary rulemaking.255 From its first application of the emer-
gency scheduling authority in 1985, the DEA has targeted rapidly 
emerging synthetic analogs of presently controlled substances under 
the CSA.256 These highly dangerous substances satisfied all the legal 
criteria required under the emergency scheduling authority, includ-
ing a high potential for abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, 
and clandestine manufacture.257 These factors are stark evidence of 
the substance’s imminent hazard to public safety and valid reasons 
for the DEA to exercise this powerful scheduling authority.258 The 
same cannot be said of the DEA’s proposed emergency scheduling 
action of kratom. 
Kratom does not fit into either category of substances for which 
the DEA originally sought the emergency scheduling authority. It is 
                                                                                                             
 251 H.R. REP. NO. 98-835, pt. 1, at 7 (1984). 
 252 Id. at 8–9. 
 253 See discussion supra Section III.A.2. 
 254 Pre-Fab Transit Co. v. United States, 595 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 255 United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–65 (1956) (discussing 
uniformity and consistency of agency decisions in the context of the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction); accord R-C Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 
1169, 1172 (M.D. Fla. 1972), aff’d mem. 411 U.S. 941 (1973). 
 256 See discussion supra Section II.B.3. 
 257 21 U.S.C. § 811(h) (2012). 
 258 Id. 
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neither a new drug of abuse of clandestine origin nor a newly abused 
drug marketed in an uncontrolled status.259 Kratom does not resem-
ble the synthetic analogs of dangerous substances controlled by the 
DEA for their abusive psychoactive properties.260 Moreover, kratom 
is not being sold or marketed under the guise of herbal incense or 
potpourri as the latest synthetic cannabinoid that the DEA con-
trolled.261 Instead, kratom is sold as a safe herbal dietary supplement 
to treat chronic pain and is viewed as an alternative to self-treat 
symptoms from opioid withdrawal.262 
Further, kratom does not constitute an imminent hazard to public 
safety similar to designer drugs.263  For example, the first synthetic 
analog controlled by the DEA—fentanyl—caused thirty-one over-
dose deaths264 and the latest synthetic cannabinoid—MAB-
CHMINACA—caused at least thirty-three overdose deaths.265 In 
sharp contrast, to date, there have been no reported overdose deaths 
from kratom alone.266 To be sure, the fifteen deaths linked to kratom 
cited by the DEA have all been either related to co-ingestion of an 
herbal blend called Krypton (that was contaminated) or included ad-
ministration of other substances.267 Furthermore, there have been no 
reports that kratom is causing persons to engage in bizarre behavior 
or to engage in harmful activities that would put others around them 
                                                                                                             
 259 See discussion supra Sections I.B., III.A.2. 
 260 See supra Section II.B.3. 
 261 Scheduling of MAB-CHMINACA, supra note 182, at 6,172. 
 262 Kratom: Survey of the Literature, supra note 70, at 43. 
 263 See supra Section II.B.3 (discussing precedent of the emergency schedul-
ing authority). 
 264 Scheduling of Fentanyl, supra note 167, at 11,691. 
 265 Scheduling of MAB-CHMINACA, supra note 182, at 6,173. 
 266 Boyer I, supra note 65, at 1049 (noting that “although mitragynines 
[kratom] agonize mu-opioid receptors, respiratory depression, coma, pulmonary 
edema and death have not . . . been associated with human kratom ingestion”); 
Warner et al., supra note 202, at 134 (noting that there is no solid evidence that 
kratom has caused death). 
 267 Kratom Three Factor Analysis, supra note 75, at 20–26; Kratom: Survey 
of the Literature, supra note 70, at 45 (noting that individual case reports linking 
kratom use to adverse reactions or fatalities involved persons who used kratom 
together with other substances). 
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in danger, similar to MDMA synthetic analogs controlled by the 
DEA.268 
The DEA’s action detracts from prior applications of the emer-
gency scheduling authority because the agency has never exercised 
such authority to control a natural, botanical substance. It has never 
tried to control a substance with a long-reported history of safe and 
responsible use that is available through legitimate avenues. Above 
all, the DEA has never exercised the emergency scheduling author-
ity without satisfying the statutory burden—that is, finding a sub-
stance poses an imminent hazard to the public safety—with suffi-
cient evidence. 
IV.  LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEA’S CONDUCT AND THE 
NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
A.  The DEA’s Conduct Constitutes an Ultra Vires Act 
The Constitution commands all legislative powers to be vested 
in a Congress.269 The nondelegation doctrine arises from the consti-
tutional mandate “that Congress may not constitutionally delegate 
its legislative power to another branch of Government.”270 Essen-
tially, the nondelegation doctrine is embedded in the “principle of 
separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Govern-
ment.”271 Yet, the Supreme Court has continuously espoused that 
the nondelegation doctrine does not foreclose Congress from seek-
ing help from its coordinate branches to carry out its legislative du-
ties.272 Thus, Congress may broadly legislate, “leaving a certain de-
gree of discretion to executive or judicial actors,” without running 
afoul of the Constitution.273 As long as Congress “lays down by leg-
                                                                                                             
 268 Scheduling of MDMA Synthetic Analogs, supra note 173, at 30,176 (not-
ing persons stopped by police for speeding or driving while intoxicated as evi-
dence of the MDMA synthetic analog’s adverse effects on the public health and 
safety). 
 269 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 270 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). 
 271 Id. at 165 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989)). 
 272 Id. (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372). 
 273 Id. 
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islative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body au-
thorized to act is directed to conform, such legislative action is not 
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”274 
When Congress enacted the CSA, it authorized the Attorney 
General to control the addition or removal of substances, or the 
transfer of a substance from one schedule to another.275 For each of 
these grants of authorization, Congress required the Attorney Gen-
eral to follow specified procedures.276 The Attorney General prom-
ulgated regulations delegating to the DEA Administrator these pow-
ers under the CSA, including the power to schedule substances on a 
temporary basis under the emergency scheduling authority.277 
In Touby v. United States, the Supreme Court considered 
whether Section 201(h) of the CSA unconstitutionally delegates leg-
islative power to the Attorney General and, in turn, whether the At-
torney General’s subsequent delegation to the DEA Administrator 
was authorized by statute.278 After a careful analysis of the pertinent 
statutes, the Court held that Congress had “meaningfully con-
strain[ed] the Attorney General’s discretion to define criminal con-
duct,” and that such “restrictions satisfy the constitutional require-
ments of the nondelegation doctrine.”279 The Court found the stat-
ute’s “imminent hazard to the public safety” requirement to be an 
intelligible principle confining the Attorney General’s discretion to 
schedule controlled substances on a temporary basis.280 In mandat-
ing such a stringent standard to trigger the emergency scheduling 
authority, Congress delineated the Attorney General’s, and by ex-
tension, the DEA’s actions.281 
                                                                                                             
 274 Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928)). 
 275 Id. at 162. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 164; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b) (2016) (delegating “functions 
vested in the Attorney General by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970, as amended”). 
 278 Touby, 500 U.S. at 162. 
 279 Id. at 167. 
 280 Id. at 165. 
 281 Id. at 166–67; see also Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944) (“When 
Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on govern-
mental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority 
granted.”). 
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Where agency action breaches a specific statutory directive, this 
results in the overstepping of the agency’s delegated authority and 
ultimately in an unconstitutional invasion of Congress’ legislative 
powers.282 Although federal agencies may well be better equipped 
to exercise discretion concerning complicated matters, it is critical 
to our democratic government to maintain that “except in a few ar-
eas constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch, the basic 
policy decisions governing society are to be made by the Legisla-
ture.”283 
The statutory command under the emergency scheduling author-
ity demands a clear-cut finding by the DEA that the scheduling of a 
substance into Schedule I is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard 
to public safety.284 Such a demanding standard of proof requires spe-
cific evidence of the three factors set forth in the statute.285 The 
DEA’s justifications, thus far, have not shown that kratom consti-
tutes an imminent hazard to public safety.286 Indeed, the DEA’s re-
liance on erroneous evidence in its analysis “renders illusory the 
mandatory language of the statutory scheme.”287 By broadening the 
scope of the emergency scheduling authority to schedule kratom, the 
DEA abused its discretion under the statutory directive. Conse-
quently, the DEA’s unprecedented action to ban kratom under the 
emergency scheduling authority constitutes an ultra vires act.288 
Because the DEA has not met its burden of proof—that is, a 
finding that scheduling kratom is necessary to avoid an imminent 
hazard to public safety—it has not satisfied the statutory directives 
                                                                                                             
 282 See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of 
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 121–22, 137–38 (2011) (arguing 
that due process concerns with arbitrary decisionmaking entail that Congress 
channel delegated administrative power through substantive, structural, and pro-
cedural constraints). 
 283 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 284 21 U.S.C. § 811(h) (2012). 
 285 Id. § 811 (h)(3). 
 286 See discussion supra Part III. 
 287 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 243 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 288 When a federal agency exercises authority beyond that authorized by Con-
gress, those actions are ultra vires. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 
(2013) (For agencies, both the “power to act and how they are to act is authorita-
tively prescribed by Congress, so that when they act improperly, no less than when 
they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires”). 
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imposed by Congress, and thus is not authorized to invoke the emer-
gency scheduling authority.289 Nevertheless, as will be discussed, 
Congress has the means to correct the actions of a federal agency 
that has exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority. 
B.  The Congressional Review Act: Kratom’s Last Hope? 
“Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of admin-
istration.”290 The Congressional Review Act,291 enacted in 1996, is 
an oversight tool that Congress may use to overturn a rule issued by 
a federal agency.292 Rulemaking authority is granted to federal agen-
cies to implement provisions of a law passed by Congress.293 Be-
cause Congress is the branch of government most accountable to the 
people, it has an interest in safeguarding that federal agencies re-
main faithful to congressional intent when issuing rules.294 
Under the CRA, prior to a rule taking effect, an agency must 
submit the final rule to Congress and to the Comptroller General of 
the Government Accountability Office.295 Members of Congress 
have a specified period of time in which to submit and act on a joint 
resolution disapproving the rule.296 If both houses pass the resolu-
tion, it is sent to the President for signature or veto.297 If the Presi-
dent vetoes the resolution, Congress can vote to override the veto.298 
The CRA, however, does not apply to proposed rules or orders 
issued by an agency because neither satisfies the CRA’s definition 
of a rule.299 The CRA differentiates between an agency’s rules and 
                                                                                                             
 289 Cf. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 297 (“No matter how it is framed, the 
question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute 
it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within 
the bounds of its statutory authority.”). 
 290 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 297 (1885). 
 291 Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868 (1996) (codified at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012)). 
 292 MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43992, THE 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2016). 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 296 CAREY ET AL., supra note 292, at 1. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. at 7. 
1018 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:972 
 
orders.300 A rule is subject to the procedures proscribed in the CRA, 
while an order is not.301 Thus, the DEA’s temporary scheduling or-
der is not subject to the CRA until a final rule is published in the 
Federal Register.302 The emergency scheduling authority creates a 
process that is an exception to the general procedural requirements 
of the CRA.303 Despite its non-application to an agency’s temporary 
order, the CRA is useful for overturning agency decisions and serves 
as a check on delegated legislative authority.304 Nevertheless, Con-
gress has other oversight tools at its disposal that have proved far 
more effective, including legislative override and the power of the 
purse, or its appropriations process.305 
C.  Going Forward 
President Donald Trump has taken steps to address the drug ad-
diction and opioid crisis, albeit rather slowly. On March 29, 2017, 
President Trump signed an Executive Order establishing the Presi-
dent’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid 
Crisis.306 The Commission is chaired by Governor Chris Christie of 
New Jersey and is tasked to “study ways to combat and treat the 
scourge of drug abuse, addiction, and the opioid crisis[.]”307 On July 
                                                                                                             
 300 United States v. Reece, 956 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 (W.D. La. 2013) (finding 
that rules and orders are two different things under the CRA). 
 301 Id.; see also United States v. Nasir, No. 5:12-CR-102-JMH, 2013 WL 
5373691, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2013) (discussing compliance with the CRA). 
 302 CAREY ET AL., supra note 292, at 7. 
 303 Reece, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 745. 
 304 But see CAREY ET AL., supra note 292, at 7 (noting that the single success-
ful use of the CRA to overturn an agency rule suggests that agencies might not 
consider the CRA to be a credible threat); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congres-
sional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 208 n.116 (2013) (noting that the CRA 
“is a redundant and ineffective tool for overturning agency actions with which 
Congress disagrees”); Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2169, 2176 (2009) (arguing that the CRA is rarely used, 
even in situations where it could be most effective). 
 305 Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
61, 82–85, (2006) (describing legislative override and the power of the purse 
among over a dozen formal and informal oversight tools employed by Congress). 
 306 Exec. Order No. 13,784, 82 Fed. Reg. 16, 283 (Mar. 29, 2017), https://ti-
nyurl.com/ya2kbx75. 
 307 Id.; see also President’s Commission, OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL 
POL’Y, https://tinyurl.com/ycgeapse (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
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31, 2017, the Commission recommended that the President declare 
a national emergency308 either under the Stafford Act, which would 
allocate Federal Emergency Management Agency funds and is di-
rected by the Homeland Security Department,309 or the Public 
Health Service Act,310 which is a more limited response under 
HHS.311  
Almost three months later, on October 26, 2017, in a much-
awaited announcement, President Trump directed the Secretary of 
HHS to declare the opioid crisis a public health emergency.312 But 
this declaration, under the PHSA, failed to propose new funding to 
tackle the opioid crisis.313 Democrats blasted President Trump for a 
halfhearted response to an escalating epidemic. Senator Edward 
Markey, a Democrat of Massachusetts, cogently stated: “America is 
hemorrhaging lives by the day because of the opioid epidemic, but 
President Trump offered the country a Band-Aid when we need a 
tourniquet[.]”314 Indeed, rather than provide emergency funds to 
states combating the opioid crisis, President Trump asserted: “The 
best way to prevent drug addiction and overdose is to prevent people 
from abusing drugs in the first place. If they don’t start, they won’t 
have a problem.”315 This proposition is not a viable solution to the 
predicament millions of Americans face each day because of life-
threatening addiction to opioids. More needs to be done. In sum, the 
                                                                                                             
 308 Meeting Minutes of the President’s Comm’n on Combating Drug Addic-
tion and the Opioid Crisis 1 (July 31, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/yauxdmnl. 
 309 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. 
No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. 
(2012)). 
 310 Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 201 et seq.). 
 311 42 U.S.C. § 319. 
 312 President Donald J. Trump is Taking Action on Drug Addiction and the 
Opioid Crisis, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 26, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/yaygl9uw [here-
inafter Trump is Taking Action]. 
 313 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis a ‘Health Emer-
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Trump administration has not acted with the urgency required to 
tackle the opioid crisis and much remains the same.316 
Meanwhile, the FDA continues its vicious hate campaign 
against kratom. On November 14, 2017, the FDA issued a public 
health advisory in which FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb warned 
that kratom poses “deadly risks” and expressed concern “that pa-
tients believe they can use kratom to treat opioid withdrawal symp-
toms.”317 While acknowledging that the opioid epidemic has 
reached a “critical point,” the Commissioner maintained: “There is 
no reliable evidence to support the use of kratom as a treatment for 
opioid use disorder.”318 Despite such denunciation, the Commis-
sioner stated, although perhaps skeptically, that there is a possibility 
for the FDA to evaluate and consider the potential medicinal bene-
fits of kratom: 
While we remain open to the potential medicinal uses 
of kratom, those uses must be backed by sound-sci-
ence and weighed appropriately against the potential 
for abuse. They must be put through a proper evalu-
ative process that involves the DEA and the FDA. To 
those who believe in the proposed medicinal uses of 
kratom, I encourage you to conduct the research that 
will help us better understand kratom’s risk and ben-
efit profile[.]319 
The FDA also announced that it is actively working to prevent ship-
ments of kratom from entering the United States.320 The agency is 
seemingly relentless and will not stop until it finds that kratom poses 
a safety threat to public health. 
Most recently, on February 6, 2018, the FDA released a state-
ment about the agency’s new “scientific analysis providing even 
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stronger evidence of kratom compounds’ opioid properties.”321 The 
FDA analyzed the chemical structures of the twenty-five most com-
mon compounds, including mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine, 
found in kratom.322 Using a computational model, FDA scientists 
concluded that “all of the compounds share the most structural sim-
ilarities with controlled opioid analgesics, such as morphine deriva-
tives.”323 The scientists also found, despite over two decades of pub-
lished scientific literature on kratom’s alkaloids,324 that kratom has 
a “strong bind” to opioid receptors in the brain, “comparable to 
scheduled opioid drugs.”325 The FDA also confirmed that it received 
information on “additional deaths involving the use of kratom”—
bringing the total number to forty-four reported deaths since 
2011.326 The FDA concluded: “Based on the scientific information 
in the literature and further supported by our computational model-
ing and the reports of its adverse effects in humans, we feel confi-
dent in calling compounds found in kratom, opioids.”327 And just 
like that, the FDA stigmatized kratom by classifying it as an opioid 
and warned that it should not be used as an alternative to prescription 
opioids.328 
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Most unsurprisingly, like the DEA’s analysis, the FDA’s scien-
tific data on kratom is dubious.329 Kratom advocates and proponents 
of alternatives to prescription opioids quickly called out the FDA for 
its bad science. A group of nine scientists sent a letter to the White 
House Opioid Crisis Team Leader, Kellyanne Conway, and to the 
DEA Acting Administrator, Robert Patterson, insisting that “placing 
kratom into Schedule I will potentially increase the number of 
deaths of Americans caused by opioids because many people who 
have found kratom to be their lifeline away from strong opioids will 
be vulnerable to resumption of that opioid use[.]”330 An opinion 
piece by the Washington Post succinctly addressed the FDA’s anti-
kratom campaign and the DEA’s potential future scheduling of 
kratom: 
With the opioid crisis claiming hundreds of lives 
each week, why would the government list this 
promising plant as a Schedule I, making research and 
testing nearly impossible? Whom is the FDA trying 
to protect – the public or Big Pharma, which loses 
profits when citizens find a safe, natural, inexpensive 
alternative to addictive opioids?331 
For now, kratom advocates must await the FDA’s final schedul-
ing recommendation on kratom, which the DEA will consider in 
making its scheduling decision.332 Once it considers all the public 
comments, as well as the FDA’s scientific and medical evaluation, 
the DEA must decide whether to proceed with the permanent or tem-
porary scheduling of kratom. If it decides to proceed with the per-
manent scheduling, a new public comment period will be allowed 
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as required under the CSA.333 If it decides instead that the temporary 
scheduling of kratom into Schedule I is warranted to avoid an im-
minent hazard to public safety, the DEA must follow statutory pro-
cedures, including publishing a new notice of intent in the Federal 
Register. Were the DEA to invoke the emergency scheduling au-
thority once more, it invites a more difficult evidentiary burden, 
given the statutory requirement of a finding of an imminent hazard 
to public safety.334 If it elects this path, the DEA must proceed with 
caution. With the prior public protest and congressional backlash,335 
the DEA must give an adequate justification for its decision and pro-
vide sufficient evidence to show that scheduling kratom under the 
emergency scheduling authority is indeed necessary to avoid an im-
minent hazard to public safety. Meanwhile, kratom advocates must 
continue to speak out against the FDA and the DEA’s stigmatization 
of kratom.336 The American Kratom Association is leading the way 
by launching a petition to President Trump to stop the criminaliza-
tion of American kratom users.337 
CONCLUSION 
Under the CSA, the DEA wields tremendous power when it 
comes to scheduling a new substance on an emergency basis. But 
the DEA must adhere to specific statutorily-defined criteria when 
exercising the emergency scheduling authority. Among these legal 
criteria, the DEA is required to make a finding that the scheduling 
of a substance is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public 
safety. This finding must be made based on specific factors deline-
ated by Congress. Kratom advocates and congressional leaders have 
inundated the DEA with evidence showing that kratom meets none 
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of the legal criteria required to invoke the emergency scheduling au-
thority. 
Despite evidence of kratom’s potential as a therapeutic alterna-
tive to the prescription opioids that are killing more Americans each 
year, the DEA remained steadfast in its inconsiderate decision to ban 
kratom. By doing so, the DEA ignored the plain intent of Congress 
and exceeded its authority under the statutory directive, thus com-
mitting an ultra vires act. Until the DEA reaches a final decision, 
kratom advocates may hope at best that, with the help of Congress 
through its oversight tools, the DEA will consider the staggering ev-
idence showing that kratom is a godsend for many Americans bat-
tling chronic pain and overcoming prescription opioid addiction. 
